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ABSTRACT
Ranking is of definitive importance to both usability and profitability of
web information systems. While ranking of results is crucial for the acces-
sibility of information to the user, the ranking of online ads increases the
profitability of the search provider. The scope of my thesis includes both
search and ad ranking.
I consider the emerging problem of ranking the deep web data considering
trustworthiness and relevance. I address the end-to-end deep web ranking by
focusing on: (i) ranking and selection of the deep web databases (ii) topic
sensitive ranking of the sources (iii) ranking the result tuples from the se-
lected databases. Especially, assessing the trustworthiness and relevances of
results for ranking is hard since the currently used link analysis is inapplicable
(since deep web records do not have links). I formulated a method—namely
SourceRank—to assess the trustworthiness and relevance of the sources based
on the inter-source agreement. Secondly, I extend the SourceRank to consider
the topic of the agreeing sources in multi-topic environments. Further, I for-
mulate a ranking sensitive to trustworthiness and relevance for the individual
results returned by the selected sources.
For ad ranking, I formulate a generalized ranking function—namely Click
Efficiency (CE)—based on a realistic user click model of ads and documents.
The CE ranking considers hitherto ignored parameters of perceived relevance
and user dissatisfaction. CE ranking guaranteeing optimal utilities for the
click model. Interestingly, I show that the existing ad and document ranking
functions are reduced forms of the CE ranking under restrictive assumptions.
Subsequently, I extend the CE ranking to include a pricing mechanism, de-
signing a complete auction mechanism. My analysis proves several desirable
properties including revenue dominance over popular Vickery-Clarke-Groves
i
(VCG) auctions for the same bid vector and existence of a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies. The equilibrium is socially optimal, and revenue equivalent
to the truthful VCG equilibrium. Further, I relax the independence assump-
tion in CE ranking and analyze the diversity ranking problem. I show that
optimal diversity ranking is NP-Hard in general, and that a constant time
approximation algorithm is not likely.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Providing the best results at the top of their ranked list is the most impor-
tant success factor of search engines. Similarly, their profitability depends
largely on placing the interesting ads in the top few slots. Improved ranking
algorithms are crucial for both these abilities. Result ranking enables the ex-
ploitation of the vast ocean of information available in both the surface web
(HTML pages) and the deep web (web databases). On the other hand, the paid
placement of ads drives the business by generating profit for the multi-billion
dollar search engine market. In brief, for today’s web with rapidly expanding
types of data and its applications, improved ranking algorithms are the single
most important problem in enhancing the usability and the profitability. We
consider these two related problems in this dissertation: ranking the deep web
data and ad ranking.
1.1 Deep Web Ranking
Considering the results ranking for search engines, we address the ranking
problems pertaining to the deep web integration systems. The deep web is
the collection of millions of databases connected to the web (examples of web
databases ranges from popular databases like Amazon and Craiglist to numer-
ous small sales catalogues). The size of the deep web is estimated to be many
times of currently searchable surface web [1, 2]. Integrating and searching
the deep web is a challenging problem with highly promising implications [1].
Since the deep web contains (semi)structured data records, the semantics im-
plied by the structure can be leveraged for better search. We formulate an
end-to-end deep web ranking by addressing the sub-problems of:
Ranking sources: Ranking sources considering trustworthiness and impor-
tance of the sources.
Topic-sensitive source ranking: Topic-sensitive analysis of trustworthiness
and importance of sources in multi-topic environments.
Ranking Results: Ranking results after retrieval from multiple sources.
The foremost challenge in searching open collections like the deep web
is assessing trustworthiness as well as importance of the information. Since
anyone may upload any information to open collections, the search is poten-
tially adversarial in nature. Among the many sources, the most trustworthy
and relevant set needs to be selected. The previous ranking approaches in
the deep web are focused on assessing the relevance based on local measures
of similarity between the query and the answers expected from the source
(c.f. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]). In the context of deep web, such a purely local
approach has two important deficiencies:
1. Query based relevance assessment is insensitive to the importance of the
source results. For example, the query godfather matches the classic
movie The Godfather as well as the little known movie Little Godfather.
Intuitively, most users are likely to be looking for the classic movie.
2. The assessment is agnostic to the trustworthiness of the answers. Trust-
worthiness is a measure of correctness of the answer (in contrast to rel-
evance, which assesses whether a tuple is answering the query, not the
correctness of the information). For example, to the query The God-
father many databases in Google Base return copies of the book with
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unrealistically low prices to attract the user attention. When the user
proceeds towards the checkout, these low priced items would turn out to
be either out of stock or a different item with the same title and cover
(e.g. solution manual of the text book).
A global measure of trust and importance is especially critical for uncon-
trolled collections like the deep web, since sources try to artificially boost their
rankings. A global relevance measure should consider popularity of a result,
as the popular results tend to be relevant. Moreover, it is imprudent to eval-
uate trustworthiness of sources and results based on local measures; since the
measure of trustworthiness of a source should not depend on any information
the source provides about itself. In general, the trustworthiness of a particular
source has to be evaluated in terms of the endorsement by other sources.
The algorithms like Pagerank [10] and HITS [11] used by the surface web
search engines solve this problem by assessing link structure of the web. But
link analysis is not applicable to the deep web since there are no hyperlinks
between the database tuples. At a high level, we deal with the problem of
assessing trustworthiness and importance in the deep web by ranking based on
the agreement between different sources. We describe the specific solutions to
these three ranking problems—ranking sources, topic-sensitive source ranking,
and ranking results—in the three sections below.
1.1.1 Source Ranking
We introduce an agreement based source selection method sensitive to trust-
worthiness and relevance. Two sources agree with each other if they return
the same records in answer to the same query. Important results are likely
to be returned by a large number of sources. Hence a global relevance assess-
ment based on the agreement of the results will rank the important results
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high. Similarly regarding trust, the corruption of results can be captured by
agreement, since other legitimate sources answering the same query are likely
to disagree with the incorrect results.
The primary challenge in computing agreement is that different web databases
represent the same entity in syntactically different ways, making the agree-
ment computation hard [12]. To solve this problem, we combine record link-
age models with entity matching methods for accurate and efficient agreement
computation.
As in the PageRank, databases may enhance SourceRank by colluding with
each other. Differentiating genuine agreement from the collusion increases
the robustness of the SourceRank. We devise a method to detect the source
dependence and compensate for dependence while computing SourceRank.
1.1.2 Topic-Sensitive Source Ranking
A straightforward idea for extending SourceRank for multi-topic deep web
search is a weighted combination with query similarity, like PageRank [10].
On the other hand, agreement by sources in the same topic is likely to be
much more indicative of importance of a source than endorsement by out of
the topic sources. Significantly, a source might have data relevant to multiple
topics. The importance of the source might vary across these topics. For
example, Barnes & Noble might be quite good as a book source but might not
be as good as a movie source (even though it has information about both the
topics). These problems are noted for surface web (c.f. Haveliwala [13]), but
are more critical for the deep web since sources are even more likely to cross
topics than single web pages. To account for this fact, we extend the deep web
source selection by assessing a topic-specific quality metric for the sources and
assessing the resulting improvement in search quality.
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To improve ranking in multiple-topics, we assess the quality of a source
predominantly based on the endorsement by sources in the same topic-domain.
For this, we use different sampling query sets for different topic-domains. The
quality score of a source for a topic solely depends on the answers to the
queries in that topic. To rank the sources for a specific user query, a Na¨ıve
Bayes Classifier (NBC) determines the topic of the query. The classifier gives
the probability with which the query may belong to different topics. These
probabilities are used to weight the topic-specific SourceRanks to compute a
single topic sensitive SourceRank (TSR).
1.1.3 Result Ranking
In a typical deep web integration system, the user enters his queries at the
mediator. The mediator will select a subset of sources based on the query and
the source ranking, and dispatch the query to the selected sources. Each of
the source will return its-own ranked set of results to the query. These ranked
sets of results need to be combined and ranked. The result ranking focuses on
solving this problem.
Though the sources are selected based on trust and relevance, within a
source there may be variance in the quality of records. The variance in quality
of results is especially high user generated web 2.0 databases (e.g. youtube,
craiglist etc.). Hence similar to the sources, considering trustworthiness and
importance is crucial for ranking results due to the same reasons elucidated for
sources above. Since tuples are ranked during the query time, time to compute
the ranking should be minimal. A simple agreement based method is to rank
in the order of first order agreements—i.e. the sum of the agreements by other
tuples. Going one level deeper, a second order agreement will consider the
common friends two tuples have, in addition to the mutual agreement. As
5
we compute higher and higher order agreements, the accuracies are likely to
increase. However computation timings increase as well, since computation
takes more iterations. We use second order agreement as a favorable balance
between the time and accuracy.
In addition to the experimental evaluations, we implemented a prototype
deep-web search engine—namely Factal—based on the source and result rank-
ing algorithms described in this dissertation.
1.2 Ad Ranking
Most search engines derive their revenues by displaying a ranked set of ads
relevant the user-query. These ads are ranked to primarily to maximize the
revenue for the search engines. But the ads have to be relevant to users in
addition to be profitable, as users will click only on relevant ads. Hence the
ad ranking needs to consider both the relevance and profitability of the ads.
Compared to ranking results, this added dimension of profitability in addition
to relevance gives rise to interesting problems in ad ranking. In the second
part of the dissertation, we consider the problem of ad ranking to maximize
the profits for the search engines.
In this dissertation, we develop a complete ad ranking and auction mech-
anism in three steps. In the first step we propose a unified optimal ranking
function based on a generalized click model of the user. In the second step,
we develop a complete auction mechanism and analyze the properties. In the
third step, we consider the problem of ranking ads considering diversity. The
details of these three steps are discussed in the three sections below.
1.2.1 Ranking and Generalizations
Ranking is essentially an optimization of expected utilities based on the click
model of users. In general, users browse through ranked lists of results or
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ads from top to bottom either clicking or skipping the results, or abandoning
browsing the list due to impatience or satiation. The goal of the ranking is to
maximize the expected relevances (or profits) of clicked results based on the
click model of the users. The sort by relevance ranking suggested by Proba-
bility Ranking Principle (PRP) has been commonly used for search results for
decades [14, 15]. In contrast, sorting by the expected profits calculated as the
product of bid amount and Click Through Rate (CTR) is popular for ranking
ads [16].
Recent click models suggest that the user click behaviors for both search
results and targeted ads are the same [17, 18]. Considering this commonality,
the only difference between the two ranking problems is the utilities of entities
ranked: for documents the utility is the relevance and for the ads it is the cost-
per-click. This suggests possibility of a unified ranking function for results and
ads. The current segregation of document and ad ranking as separate areas
does not consider this commonality. A unified approach can help to widen
the scope of the related research to these two areas, and enable applications
of existing ranking functions in one area to isomorphic problems in the other
area as we will show below.
In addition to the unified approach, the recent click models consider the
following parameters:
1. Browsing Abandonment: The user may abandon browsing ranked
list at any point. The likelihood of abandonment may depend on the
entities the user has already seen [18].
2. Perceived Relevance: Perceived relevance is the user’s relevance as-
sessment viewing only the search snippet or ad impression. The decision
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to click or not depends on the perceived relevance, not on the actual
relevance of the results [19, 20].
Though these two considerations are part of the click models [17, 18] how to ex-
ploit these parameters to improve ranking is unknown. The current document
ranking is based on the simplifying assumption that the perceived relevance
is equal to the actual relevance of the document, and ignores the browsing
abandonment. The ad placement partially considers perceived relevance, but
ignores abandonment probabilities.
We propose a unified optimal ranking function—namely Click Efficiency
(CE)—based on a generalized click model of the user. CE is defined as the ratio
of the standalone utility generated by an entity to the sum of the abandonment
probability and click probability of that entity (abandonment probability is the
probability for the user to abandon browsing the list after viewing the entity).
The sum of the abandonment and click probability may be viewed as the click
probability consumed by the entity. We derive the name Click Efficiency based
on this view—similar to the definition of the mechanical efficiency of a machine
as the ratio of the output to the input energy. We show that sorting in the
descending order of CE of entities guarantees optimum ranking utility. We do
not make assumptions on the utilities of the entities, which may be assessed
relevance for documents or cost per click (CPC) charged based on the auction
for ads. On plugging in the appropriate utilities—relevance for documents and
CPC for the ads—the ranking specializes to document and ad ranking.
As a consequence of the generality, the proposed ranking will reduce to
specific ranking problems on assumptions on the user behavior. We enumer-
ate a hierarchy of ranking functions corresponding to the limiting assumptions
on the click model. Most interestingly, some of these special cases correspond
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to the currently used document and ad ranking functions—including PRP and
sort by expected profit described above. Further, some of the reduced ranking
functions suggest new rankings for special cases of the click model—like a click
model in which the user never abandons the search, or the perceived relevance
is approximated as the actual relevance. This hierarchy elucidates intercon-
nection between different ranking functions and the assumptions behind the
rankings. We believe that this will help in choosing the appropriate ranking
function for a particular user click behavior.
1.2.2 Pricing and Mechanism Design
Ad auctions specify a ranking and a pricing—how much each advertiser is
charged. The profit of the search engines depends on ranking as well as pric-
ing. Hence to apply the CE ranking to ad placement, a pricing mechanism
has to be associated. We incorporate a second price based pricing mechanism
with the proposed ranking. Our analysis establishes many interesting proper-
ties of the proposed mechanism. Particularly, we state and prove the existence
of a Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. At this equilibrium the profits of
the search engine and the total revenue of the advertisers is simultaneously
optimized. Like ranking, this is a generalized auction mechanism, and reduces
to the existing Generalized Second Price auction (GSP) and Overture mecha-
nisms under the same assumptions as that of the ranking. Further, the stated
Nash Equilibrium is a general case of the equilibriums of these existing mech-
anisms. Comparing the mechanism properties with that of VCG [21, 22, 23],
we show that for the same bid vector search engine revenue for the CE mech-
anism will be greater or equal to that of VCG. Further, the revenue for the
proposed equilibrium is equal to the revenue of the truthful dominant strategy
equilibrium of VCG.
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1.2.3 Diversity Ranking
Our analysis so far was based on the assumption of parameter independence
between the ranked entities. We relax this assumption and analyze the impli-
cations based on a specific well known problem—diversity ranking [24, 25, 26].
Diversity ranking tries to maximize the collective utility of top-k ranked en-
tities. For a ranked list, an entity will reduce the residual utility of a similar
entity in the list below it. Though optimizing many of the specific ranking
functions incorporating diversity is known to be NP-Hard [24], an understand-
ing of why this is an inherently hard problem is lacking. By analyzing a signif-
icantly general case, we show that even the very basic formulation of diversity
ranking is NP-Hard. Further we extend our proof showing that a constant
ratio approximation algorithm is unlikely. As a benefit of the generality of
ranking, these results are applicable both for ads and documents.
1.3 Contributions of the Dissertation
The direct impact of the dissertation is on the ranking for the deep web and
search ads. In addition to these, we believe that the proposed methods will
have wider impact on ranking of open data collections with no explicit links,
and other profit-sensitive ranking problems. The specific contributions of the
deep web and ad ranking research are described in the following two sections.
1.3.1 Contributions in Deep Web Ranking
The most important contribution in document ranking is a method to assess
trustworthiness and relevance in open data collections with no explicit hy-
perlinks. The basic trust assessment has been augmented by measuring and
compensating collusion between the sources. Finally, the method has been
extended to multi-topic environments and result ranking, completing an end-
to-end ranking for the deep web integration. All methods are evaluated in
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multiple large scale real-world data sets. In addition to the evaluations, we
implemented our methods in a prototype search engine.
In summery, the specific contributions of the dissertation in document
ranking are enumerated below.
1. An agreement based method to calculate relevance of the deep web
sources based on popularity.
2. An agreement based method to calculate trustworthiness of the deep
web sources.
3. Topic independent computation of the agreement between the deep web
sources.
4. A method for detecting collusion between the web sources.
5. Formal evaluations on large sets of sources.
6. Ranking of results considering trust and importance.
7. Topic sensitive source ranking.
Though the immediate impact of the dissertation is in deep web integration
and search, we believe that the methods used may be extended to source and
result ranking of other open data collections.
1.3.2 Contributions in Ad Ranking
The dissertation formulates an optimal ranking and auction strategy consider-
ing recent user browsing models. The ranking has been analyzed to illustrate
applicability in a wide range of ranking problems. Subsequently, we associate
pricing with the ranking to formulate a complete ad-auction mechanism. The
properties of the mechanism have been analyzed including the equilibrium
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properties. Further, the revenues of the search engine and the advertisers are
compared with other popular auction mechanisms.
The specific contributions of the dissertation in ad ranking are enumerated
below.
1. Unified optimal ranking based on a generalized click model.
2. Optimal ranking considering abandonment probabilities for documents
and ads.
3. Optimal Ranking considering perceived relevance of documents and ads.
4. A unified hierarchy of ranking functions and enumerating optimal rank-
ings for different click models.
5. Analysis of general diversity ranking problem and hardness proofs.
6. Design and analysis of a generalized ad auction mechanism incorporating
pricing with CE ranking.
7. Proving the existence of a socially optimal Nash Equilibrium with opti-
mal advertisers revenue as well as optimal search engine profit.
8. Proof of search engine revenue dominance over VCG for equivalent bid
vectors, and equilibrium revenue equivalence to the truthful VCG equi-
librium.
Though the immediate impact is on the ad ranking, we believe that the
proposed ranking will have impact on related ranking problems with a profit
considerations; like recommendations and daily deals. The illustrated com-
monality between the ad and document rankings may result in closer integra-
tion of these two areas.
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1.4 Organization of the Dissertation
The organization of the remaining chapters of the dissertation and brief overview
of contents is given below.
Chapter 2 gives the necessary background on both deep web integration
and ad-ranking. Typical integration system architecture, existing ranking ap-
proaches, challenges in ranking, and fundamentals of ad auctions are described.
Chapter 3 describes the method to assess the relevance and trustworthiness
of the sources. Further, the agreement computation between the sources,
computing the final source ranks, and source-collusion detection are described.
The precision, trustworthiness, and timing of the method are evaluated in
multiple data sets
Chapter 4 describes the topic sensitive assessment of the source quality.
We describe the topic-wise query classifications and separate evaluations in
this chapter.
Chapter 5 describes the ranking of the results returned by the sources and
evaluations. The quality of the results and timing are evaluated in separate
data sets. Further we describe the architecture of our end-to-end deep web
integration prototype—namely Factal.
Chapter 6 describes our entire contributions to ad-ranking. The chapter
describes the optimal ranking function and ranking taxonomy showing ap-
plicability to related ranking problems. Further we associate a pricing with
the ranking to formulate a complete auction mechanism. The properties of
the mechanism are analyzed in detail and compared with other popular ad-
auctions.
Chapter 7 lists the background research in the area and describes the con-
nections and differences to my research.
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Chapter 8 presents our conclusions and possible future extensions to the
dissertation.
While short proofs are presented in the respective chapters, longer proofs
are presented separately in the Appendix.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter describes the background on information integration and ad auc-
tions required to easily understand the rest of the dissertation. We start by
discussing deep web search scenario and typical approaches. Further, we de-
scribe considerations and challenges in ranking sources and multi-topic ranking
for the deep web. Subsequently, we elucidate additional challenges in ranking
the deep web results.
Section 2.5 gives an overview of ad ranking and describes a the profit and
relevance considerations. Subsequently, we describe ad auction mechanisms,
explain importance of Nash-equilibrium, and describe the popular auction
mechanisms.
2.1 Searching the Deep Web
Searching the deep web has been identified as the next big challenge in infor-
mation management [1]. There have been multiple approaches for searching
the deep web with varying levels of difficulties and effectiveness. Source and
result ranking problems we address in this dissertation are common to all these
approaches.
2.1.1 Approaches
The easiest of these approaches—generally called surfacing approach—is com-
monly used by current search engines [27]. For surfacing, the deep web records
are crawled by using the sampling queries and indexed like any other HTML
page. The structure of the records is not considered for the search. The
advantage of surfacing is easiness, ability to leverage on existing surface-web
indexing and search capabilities, and ability to handle search volumes inde-
pendent of capacities of individual sources. On the other hand, this method
has the disadvantages of losing the semantics implied by the structure of the
records, need for centralized storage, and difficulties to maintain data coher-
ence.
Another approach to deep web search is building a centralized record
warehouse—like the Google Base [28]. In this approach, records from number
of databases are collected in a central structured warehouse. The advantages
are maintaining the structure and ability to handle search volumes irrespective
of the capacities of the individual databases. Disadvantages of this approach
are need for a large centralized repository, difficulties in maintaining data co-
herence, and difficulties in retrieving the data in structured form.
The third, and presumably the most scalable approach that has emerged
is data integration. In this approach is explained in Figure 2.1, the user enters
the query at a central mediator. In response to the user query, the mediator
selects a subset of sources and issues the query. The answers returned by
different sources are aggregated and re-ranked before returning to the user.
The advantage of this approach is the ability to consider structure for improved
search, dispensability of a central storage, and ability to leverage distributed
search capability of individual sources. Considering the scale, built-in search
capabilities of individual sources, and dynamic nature of data, integration
may be the most promising approach. The disadvantages are added technical
challenges in source selection—as query volume should be within the source
capacity—and complexity in sampling of sources.
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Figure 2.1: Deep web integration scenario. The sources belong to different
domains (topics). In response to the user query, the mediator selects a subset
of sources and issues the query. The answers returned by different sources are
aggregated and re-ranked before returning to the user.
2.1.2 Ranking
For all the three approaches described above, source and result ranking prob-
lems are of paramount importance. The first phase of ranking—source ranking—
orders sources based on the quality to select the best sources. In centralized
approaches like surfacing and warehousing, the source quality assessment com-
bined with the lineage (source of origin) gives an estimate of the data quality.
After identifying high quality sources, the relevant records are fetched from
these data source. In a centralized approach, this fetching may be based on an
index. For the integration approach, the fetching is based on the distributed
search by sending queries to the selected sources followed by parsing of the re-
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turned results. After fetching the results, the second phase is to rank the result
returned by the selected sources to formulate the final ranked list. Another
possibility—especially for the centralized approaches—is to combine these two
phases to formulate a single score for the results combining source and result
quality scores.
An additional challenge in the source quality assessment in the deep web is
that the sources are segregated into multiple topics. Intuitively, the quality of
a source may vary from domain to domain. For example, a source containing
both books and movies may give high quality book results but low quality
movie results. Hence it is the best to assess the source quality with respect
to a domain. The query topic may be identified using a classifier, and source
qualities for query topic may be used for ranking sources. This domain specific
source selection incurs the query classification problem, in addition to the
problem of assessing topic specific source quality.
We discuss these three problems of source ranking, result ranking, and
domain-sensitive source ranking in the following three sections.
2.2 Ranking Sources
Most of the deep web sources are relational databases accessible by keyword
queries. Sources generally implement a keyword search and a ranking. Users
enters keyword queries in web forms and result pages containing relevant an-
swers are returned in HTML.
To give a brief overview on deep web data, though the data is stored as
structured tuples, results are generally wrapped in HTML for presentation.
Unlike the static surface web pages, the pages corresponding to the deep web
records are created dynamically at search time. The HTTP links to these
dynamic pages are rare. Information extraction from the deep web is facilitated
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by the structure of the records. In spite of wrapping in the HTML, deep web
results of the same source generally follow a repetitive template making it
easier to extract the structure [29]. Many deep web sources allows only basic
keyword search. Obtaining more information like statistics on contents and
accessing complete data is hard at best. Another difficulty in analyzing the
deep web data is that the same entities often represented (named) differently
in different sources [12]. This non-uniform naming makes it hard to identify
the same entities across different sources.
As we discussed in the introduction, basic idea of our ranking is to assess
the quality of the deep web sources based on inter-sources agreement. Due to
the nature of the deep web data described, realizing agreement based ranking
faces multiple challenges:
1. Computing Agreement: The primary problem in computing agree-
ment is that different web databases represent the same entity syntacti-
cally differently, making the agreement computation hard [12]. Solving
this problem requires a combination of the record linkage in databases
with inexact matching methods in information retrieval and named en-
tity matching.
2. Non-Cooperative Sources: Most web databases are non-cooperative,
as the access is limited to top-k answers to a keyword query. Hence the
source quality assessment is restricted to limited keyword based sam-
pling.
3. Combating Source Collusion: Like PageRank, the databases may
enhance ranks by colluding with each other for increasing mutual en-
dorsement. Differentiating genuine agreement between the sources from
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the collusion increases the robustness of the ranking. We need effec-
tive methods to distinguish genuine agreement between the sources from
source collusion.
We discuss the details of our methods to deal with these problems in Chapter 3.
2.3 Multi-Topic Ranking
Deep web sources are spread across multiple topics, as shown in Figure 2.1.
A straight forward idea to extend the source ranking to multiple topics is to
combine a domain-oblivious SourceRank to a query specific relevance assess-
ment of sources. For example, for the query godfather, all the relevant sources
containing the keyword may be identified based on a index on the sample data.
After this, one or more of the sources among these relevant sources may be
selected based on a static source ranking.
Our approach is to have one static source ranking for each possible search
topic. The advantage is that the source quality is sensitive to the query-topic.
In this approach, a source quality metric is computed for every topic in the
search space. The sources which are members of more than one topic will have
multiple quality scores corresponding to each domain. The query is classified
into one or more topic classes at query time. Based on this query classification
we combine the source scores from query-topic classes to form the final source
ranking. For example, if the query godfather is likely to be a movie query with
probability 0.6 and a book query with probability 0.4, we combine movie and
book SourceRank scores of every sources with weights 0.6 and 0.4 respectively
for the combined ranking.
This approach of topic specific search entails multiple challenges:
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• Query classification: The membership of each query in topics need
to be determined. This classification is time-critical since it is a query
time process.
• Multiple source rankings: Instead of computing a single ranking for
each source, multiple ranking for a source need to be computed corre-
sponding to each domain of the source. This incurs different additional
sampling challenges and computation time.
We describe the details of multi-topic source ranking in in Chapter 4.
2.4 Ranking Results
After ranking sources and retrieving the results, the final stage of searching
the deep web is to combine and rank the results. A straightforward approach
is to rank the results by keyword similarity. But the keyword similarity has
the deficiency of disregarding the importance of trustworthiness of results as
we mentioned in the introduction.
A seemingly related problem is merging of multiple ranked lists [6]. An
important difference of our problem is that the sources do not return the
ranking scores of the results. Further, weighing in the original order in which
the sources returned the results may not be desirable, since the deep web
ranking may be adversarial. Hence we target to evaluate the result quality
from scratch based on a global approach.
The unique challenges in ranking results are:
1. Computation Time: Since the ranking of results has to be at the
query time, the ranking time is directly added to the response time of
the search engine. Since faster response is a critical success factor for
the search engines, the ranking must be fast.
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2. Importance of Result Lineage: Though the quality of the results
depends on the source of origin, the degree of this dependence vary
for different sources. For example a web 2.0 source (sources with user
generated content like Youtube and Craiglist) the result quality may
vary widely for different results. On the other hand, a closed database
like Amazon would have more uniform quality. Deciding proper weight
for the lineage in tuple quality evaluation may be challenging.
3. Diversity Vs Uniformity: Diversifying the results for ambiguous
queries is likely to increases the overall relevance of the result sets. De-
termining the right amount of diversification of results is hard [25].
In this dissertation, the essential condition of acceptable computation tim-
ing is addressed. We leave the other two problems for the future research.
2.5 Ranking Ads
In this section we briefly describe ad ranking and pricing in a high level.
Generally, search engines list sponsored search ads along with the organic
search results. The difference between the sponsored results (ads) and organic
results is that the advertisers pay for the user visits, whereas organic results
are displayed free of cost. In general, advertisers bid for clicks in a per-click
basis. Ads are selected and ranked based on the query of the user and bid
value per click of the advertisers. Search ads need to be relevant to the users
to maximize number of clicks. Simultaneously, the bids on the ads need to be
high as well for maximal revenue from each click.
The overall ad ranking scenario is shown in Figure 2.2. The three parties
involved are search engine, users and advertisers. The search engine acts as an
intermediary between the users and the advertiser. Advertisers place bids for
each keyword indicating their valuation of the clicks. Based on the bid values
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Figure 2.2: Ad ranking scenario. In response to the user query, search engine
displays a ranked set of ads based on the bids and relevances of ads. User
may click on these ads and visit the advertisers. Advertisers pay an amount
(generally on a per-click basis) depending on their bids and the pricing strategy
of the search engine.
and the pricing schema, search engine decides how much each advertiser has
to pay for a click. When a user issues a query, ads relevant to the query are
shown to the user in an order determined by the ranking schema. The user
browses through this list of ads—clicking or skipping. The search engine gets
revenues by charging the advertisers for the clicks. The advertisers get their
revenue by the possible purchases of goods or services by the clicked users.
To give an overview of the dynamics of ad auctions, search engine decides
the ranking of the ads based on the relevance and bid amounts. Generally,
the primary objective of the ranking is to maximize the profit for the search
engine. The number of clicks on an ad depends on the position and the
relevance of the ad. More relevant the ad appears to the users, more likely the
ad to be clicked. The users infer the relevance of the ad from the ad snippet
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(displayed title and short description) and decide to click or not to click. This
user inferred relevance of the ad from the snippet is called perceived relevance.
Perceived relevance may be different from the actual relevance—the relevance
of the URL the ad is pointing to. Higher the perceived relevance of the ad to
the user, higher the click probability of the ad.
The positional dependence of the click probability of an ad is captured by
the click models [30]. Click models describe a general pattern in which the
users browse the ads. Most models agree that the users start from the top ads,
and progress downwards. This essentially means that it is profitable to place
ads with higher bids and relevances higher up in the list to maximize profits.
From the advertiser’s point of view, it is better to be higher in the ranked list
to receive more clicks. In general, ad rankings are formulated such that the
positions of ads go up with the bid values to encourage the advertisers to bid
high.
While ranking decides placing of ads pricing decides how much each ad-
vertiser pays for the clicks. Advertisers place keyword bids based on their
click valuations. Based on the bid amount and pricing schema, search engines
decide the pay-per-click (PPC)—amount the advertisers pay to the search en-
gine for each click. PPC may be different from the bid of the advertiser. For
example, the CPC is equal to the next higher bid for the keyword for second
price auctions.
Ranking and pricing have to consider multiple factors for optimizing profit.
A major challenge is considering both relevance and bids for ranking, and
how to combine these two quantities to optimize profit. Another aspect is
considering the mutual influence between the ads—i.e. effect of an ad in the
list on the click probability of other ads. Further, the advertisers will keep
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experimenting by changing their bids to maximize the profit. In addition to
the immediate profit, ranking and pricing may have to consider effects like
change in profits for the advertisers, easiness to decide a bid amount etc.
affecting long term search engine profits.
2.6 Ad Auctions
The ranking and pricing together compose an auction mechanism. In this
section we describe the adversarial nature of ad auctions, Nash equilibriums,
and popular auction mechanisms.
The advertisers may change their bids hundreds of times a day to increase
profits. The advertiser’s profit is number of clicks times difference of click value
and PPC. The position of an ad—hence the number of clicks—increases with
the increase in the bid amount. On the other hand, the PPC tends to increase
with the bid amount as well. Every advertiser has to optimize his bid consid-
ering these two conflicting effects on profits. Further, position of the advertiser
depends on bids of the other advertisers also. Since an advertiser do not know
the bids of other advertisers, he has to resort to try and test—changing his
bids and checking the resulting position. As the other advertisers change their
bids, the optimal bid for the advertiser will change as well. As every advertiser
tries to optimize bids, the advertisers are in a constant competition for higher
positions resulting in ever changing bid values [31].
This dynamically changing bids are likely to reach a state of equilibrium
eventually [32]. At an equilibrium stage, no advertiser will be able to improve
his profit by changing his bid amounts. Hence no advertiser has an incentive
to change his bid unilaterally. In other words, the bid value of every advertiser
is a best response to bid values of other advertisers. This equilibrium stage
corresponds to a study state in bid values. Such a study state corresponds to
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a Nash equilibrium in ad auctions. There may be multiple Nash equilibriums
for an auction mechanism. The stable revenue from an auction mechanism is
likely to be the revenue corresponding to one of the Nash equilibriums. Hence
properties and revenues corresponding to the Nash equilibriums are of high
interest in mechanism design.
2.6.1 Popular Auction Mechanisms
We discuss two of the most popular auction mechanisms for online ads, which
we use as benchmarks later in the dissertation.
2.6.1.1 Vickery-Clarke-Groves Auction (VCG)
In VCG [21, 22, 23] the ads are ranked in the order of the expected revenues.
Expected revenue from an ad is equal to the product of the bid amount and
click through rate (CTR). CTR is the probability of a user clicking the ad
having viewed it. The pricing for an ad is equal to the total lose in revenue to
the other advertisers due to its presence in the auction. For example, suppose
there are two advertisers. Let us assume that the CTR of both the ads are one
for simplicity. The first advertiser bids 3 dollars and wins the top position,
and receives, say 10 clicks. The second advertiser bids 2 dollars, and receives
6 clicks. If the first advertisers were not bidding, the second advertiser would
have placed in the top position receiving 10 clicks instead of 6. So the total
amount charged to the first advertiser is the increase in profit of the second
bidder i.e. 4 × 2 = $8. An excellent property of the VCG is that the truth
telling is the dominant strategy: profit for every advertiser is the maximum if
he bids his true valuation of clicks irrespective of other bids.
2.6.1.2 Generalized Second Price Auction
This is the strategy used by the Google search engine [31]. GSP ranks the ads
by the expected profits like VCG. Unlike VCG, GSP uses a simple pricing,
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in which the pay-per-click is equal to the next highest bid. GSP pricing is
different from VCG if there are more than two bidders. Truth telling is not
a dominant strategy in GSP. GSP is revenue dominant over VCG, i.e. for
any equilibrium in GSP the revenue of the search engine is at least as high as
dominant strategy (truth telling) equilibrium of VCG [31].
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Chapter 3
Ranking Deep-web Sources
Semantically rich structured data in the deep web is spread across millions
of sources. Intuitively, the first step in finding the right information in the
deep web is selecting the right sources. While selecting the sources, number
of quality attributes like relevance, correctness of the information, topic of
the source, response time of the sources etc. need to be considered. Many
of these attributes can be estimated by directly borrowing ideas from the
surface web search. However, existing methods for evaluating trustworthiness
and relevance of data are not applicable to the deep web. Hence we focus
specifically on these two problems in this chapter.
As we mentioned above, our method relies on agreement between the
sources. We give a formal explanation of why agreement implies trustwor-
thiness and importance. Graph representation of the agreement is described
in Section 3.2. Subsequently, we describe random walk based computation of
SourceRank—our ranking function. Next section describes three level compu-
tation of the agreement and query based sampling of the data sources. Next,
we address the robustness of SourceRank. We describe detecting and com-
pensating for the collusion. We evaluate the methods in multiple datasets.
The relevance, trustworthiness, timing, and effectiveness SourceRank and of
collusion detection are evaluated. The experiments demonstrate effectiveness
of the proposed source ranking and collusion detection as well as acceptable
computation timings.
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Figure 3.1: Agreement implies trust and relevance. Universal set U is the
search space, RT is the intersection of trustworthy tuple set T and relevant
tuple set R (RT is unknown). R1, R2 and R3 are the result sets of three sources.
Since all three result sets are the estimates of RT , the results agreed by other
result sets are likely to overlap more with RT .
3.1 Agreement as Endorsement
In this section we show that the result set agreement is an implicit form of
endorsement. In Figure 3.1 let RT be the set of relevant and trustworthy tuples
for a query, and U be the search space (the universal set of tuples searched).
Let r1 and r2 be two tuples independently picked by two sources from RT
(i.e. they are relevant and trustworthy), and PA(r1, r2) be the probability of
agreement of the tuples (for now think of “agreement” of tuples in terms of
high degree of similarity; we shall look at the specific way agreement between
tuples is measured in Section 3.4).
PA(r1, r2) =
1
|RT | (3.1)
Similarly let f1 and f2 be two irrelevant (or untrustworthy) tuples picked by
two sources and PA(f1, f2) be the agreement probability of these two tuples.
Since f1 and f2 are from U −RT
PA(f1, f2) =
1
|U −RT | (3.2)
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For any web database search, the search space is much larger than the set of
relevant tuples, i.e. |U |  |RT |. Applying this in Equation 3.1 and 3.2 implies
PA(r1, r2) PA(f1, f2) (3.3)
For example, assume that the user issues the query Godfather for the God-
father movie trilogy. Three movies in the trilogy— The Godfather I, II and
III—are thus the results relevant to the user. Let us assume that the total
number of movies searched by all the databases (search space U) is 104. In
this case PA(r1, r2) =
1
3
and PA(f1, f2) =
1
104
(strictly speaking 1
104−3). Simi-
larly the probability of three sources agreeing are 1
9
and 1
108
for relevant and
irrelevant results respectively.
Let us now extend this argument for answer sets from two sources. In
Figure 3.1 R1, R2 and R3 are the result sets returned by three independent
sources. The result sets are best effort estimates of RT (assuming a good
number of genuine sources). Typically the results sets from individual sources
would contain a fraction of relevant and trustworthy tuples from RT , and a
fraction of irrelevant tuples from U − RT . By the argument in the preceding
paragraph, tuples from RT are likely to agree with much higher probability
than tuples from U −RT . This implies that the more relevant tuples a source
returns, the more likely that other sources agree with its results.
Though the explanation above assumes independent sources, it holds for
partially dependent sources as well. However, the ratio of two probabilities (i.e.
the ratio of probability in Equation 3.1 to Equation 3.2) will be smaller than
that for the independent sources. For added robustness of the SourceRank
against source dependence, in Section 3.6 we assess and compensate for the
collusion between the sources.
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Figure 3.2: A sample agreement graph structure of three sources. The weight
of the edge from Si to Sj is computed by Equation 3.5. The weights of links
from every source Si are further normalized against sum of the weights out
links of Si.
3.2 Creating the Agreement Graph
To facilitate the computation of SourceRank, we represent the agreement be-
tween the source result sets as an agreement graph. Agreement graph is a
directed weighted graph as shown in example Figure 3.2. In this graph, the
vertices represent the sources, and weighted edges represent the agreement be-
tween the sources. The edge weights correspond to the normalized agreement
values between the sources. For example, let R1 and R2 be the result sets of
the source S1 and S2 respectively. Let a = A(R1, R2) (0 ≤ a ≤ 1) be the
agreement between the results sets (calculated as described in Section 3.4).
In the agreement graph we create two edges: one from S1 to S2 with weight
equal to a|R2| ; and one from S2 to S1 with weight equal to
a
|R1| . The semantics
of the weighted link from S1 to S2 is that S1 endorses S2, where the fraction
of tuples endorsed in S2 is equal to the weight. Since the endorsement weights
are equal to the fraction of tuples, rather than the absolute number, they are
asymmetric.
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As we shall see in Section 3.4, the agreement weights are estimated based
on the results to a set of sample queries. To account for the sampling bias
in addition to the agreement links described above, we also add smoothing
links with small weights between every pair of vertices. These smoothing
links account for the unseen samples. That is, though there is no agreement
between the sampled results sets used to calculate the links, there is a non-zero
probability for some of the results to agree for queries not used for sampling.
This probability corresponding to unseen samples are accounted by smoothing
links with small weights. Adding this smoothing probability, the overall weight
w(S1 → S2) of the link from S1 to S2 is:
AQ(S1, S2) =
∑
q∈Q
A(R1q, R2q)
|R2q| (3.4)
w(S1 → S2) = β + (1− β)× AQ(S1, S2)|Q| (3.5)
where R1q and R2q are the answer sets of S1 and S2 for the query q, and Q
is the set of sampling queries over which the agreement is computed. β is the
smoothing factor. We set β at 0.1 for our experiments. Empirical studies like
Gleich et al. [33] may help more accurate estimation. These smoothing links
strongly connect the agreement graph (we shall see that strong connectivity
is important for the convergence of SourceRank calculation). Finally we nor-
malize the weights of out links from every vertex by dividing the edge weights
by sum of the out edge weights from the vertex. This normalization allows
us to interpret the edge weights as the transition probabilities for the random
walk computations.
3.3 Calculating SourceRank
Let us start by considering certain desiderata that a reasonable measure of
reputation defined with respect to the agreement graph must satisfy:
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1. Nodes with high in-degree should get higher rank—since high in-degree
sources are endorsed by a large number of sources, they are likely to be
more trustworthy and relevant.
2. Endorsement from a source with a high in-degree should be more re-
spected than endorsed from a source having smaller in-degree. Since a
highly-endorsed source is likely to be more relevant and trustworthy, the
source endorsed by a highly-endorsed source is also likely to be of high
quality.
The agreement graph described above provides important guidance in se-
lecting relevant and trustworthy sources. Any source that has a high degree
of endorsement by other relevant sources is itself a relevant and trustwor-
thy source. This transitive propagation of source relevance (trustworthiness)
through agreement links can be captured in terms of a fixed point computa-
tion [10]. In particular, if we view the agreement graph as a markov chain, with
sources as the states, and the weights on agreement edges specifying the proba-
bilities of transition from one state to another, then the asymptotic stationary
visit probabilities of the markov random walk will correspond to a measure of
the global relevance of that source. We call this measure SourceRank.
The markov random walk based ranking does satisfy the two desiderata
described above. The graph is strongly connected and irreducible, hence the
random walk is guaranteed to converge to the unique stationary visit proba-
bilities for every node. This stationary visit probability of a a node is used as
the SourceRank of that source.
The SourceRank thus obtained may be combined with query similarity
based score of the source (please refer to Section 3.7.1.3 for details) to get the
33
Title Casting
1 Godfather, The: The Coppola James Caan /
Restoration Marlon Brando more
2 Godfather, The Widescreen Marlon Brando/
Restoration James Caan more
(a) Tuples from first source
Title Casting
1 The Godfather - The Coppola Marlon Brando,
Restoration Giftset [Blu-ray] Al Pacino
2 The Godfather - The Coppola Marlon
Restoration Giftset DVD Brando et al.
(b) Tuples from second source
Table 3.1: Sample tuples returned by two movies databases to the query God-
father are shown in Table (a) and (b). Note that the tittles and casting
referring to same entity syntactically differs from each other.
final ranking score as,
Score = α× querySim+ (1− α)× SourceRank (3.6)
where 1 ≥ α ≥ 0 is a proportionality constant.
3.4 Computing Agreement
If the sources are fully relational and share the same schema and values, the
agreement computation between two tuples will reduce to equality between
them. On the other extreme, if the sources are text databases then the agree-
ment between two items will have to be measured in terms of textual similarity.
Deep web sources present an interesting middle ground between the free-text
sources in IR, and the fully-structured sources in relational databases. Hence
to address challenges in agreement computation of deep web results we have
to combine and extend methods from both these disciplines. Our method
of computing agreement between the sources involves following three levels
of similarity computations: (a) attribute value similarity (b) tuple similarity,
and (c) result set similarity.
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3.4.1 Attribute value similarity:
If the different web databases were using common domains for the names,1
calculating agreement between the databases is trivial. But unfortunately,
assumption of common domains rarely holds in web databases [12]. For ex-
ample, the title and casting attributes of tuples referring to the same movie
returned from two databases are shown in Table 3.1(a) and 3.1(b). Identifying
the semantic similarity between these tuples is not straightforward, since the
titles and actor lists show wide syntactic variation.
The textual similarity measures work best for scenarios involving web
databases with no common domains [12]. Since this challenge of matching
attribute values is essentially a name matching task, we calculate the agree-
ment between attribute values using SoftTF-IDF with Jaro-Winkler as the
similarity measure [34]. SoftTF-IDF measure is similar to the normal TF-IDF
measure. But instead of considering only exact same words in two documents
to calculate similarity, SoftTF-IDF also considers occurrences of similar words.
Formally, let vi and vj be the values compared, and C(θ, vi, vj) be the set
of words for w ∈ vi such that there is some u ∈ vj with sim(w, u) > θ.
Let D(w, vj) = maxu∈vjsim(w, u). The V(w, vi) are the normal TF values
weighted by log(IDF ) used in the basic TF-IDF. SoftTFIDF is calculated as,
SIM(vi, vj) =
∑
w∈C(θ,vi,vj)
V(w, vi)V(u, vj)D(w, vj) (3.7)
We used Jaro-Winkler as a secondary distance function sim above with an
empirically determined θ = 0.6. Comparative studies show that this combi-
nation provides best performance for name matching [34]. For pure numerical
1common domains means names referring to the same entity are the same for all the
databases, or can be easily mapped to each other by normalization
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Figure 3.3: Example tuple similarity calculation. The dotted line edges denote
the similarities computed, and the solid edges represent the matches picked
by the greedy matching algorithm.
values (like price) we calculate similarity as the ratio of the difference of values
to the maximum of the two values.
3.4.2 Tuple similarity
The tuples are modeled as a vector of bags [12]. The problem of matching
between two tuples based on the vector of bags model is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.3. If we know which attribute in t1 maps to which attribute in t2, then
the similarity between the tuples is simply the sum of the similarities between
the matching values. The problem of finding this mapping is the well known
automated answer schema mapping problem in web databases [35]. We do not
assume predefined answer schema mapping, and hence reconstruct the schema
mapping based on the attribute value similarities as described below.
The complexity of similarity computation between the attribute values (i.e.
building edges and weights in Figure 3.3) of two tuples t1 and t2 is O(|t1||t2|)
(this is equal to the number of attribute value comparisons required). After
computing these edges, a single attribute value in t1 may be similar to multiple
attributes in t2 and vice versa. The optimal matching should pick the edges
(matches) such that the sum of the matched edge weights would be maximum.
Sopt(t, t
′) = arg max
M
∑
(vi∈t,v2∈t′)∈M
SIM(v1, v2) (3.8)
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Note that this problem is isomorphic to the well known maximum weighted
bipartite matching problem. The Hungarian algorithm gives the lowest time
complexity for the maximum matching problem, and is O(V 2log(V )+V E) (in
the context of our agreement calculation problem, V is the number attribute
values to be matched, and E is the number of similarity values). Since E is
O(V 2) for our problem the overall time complexity is O(V 3).
Running time is an important factor for calculating agreement at the web
scale. Considering this, instead of the O(V 3) optimal matching discussed
above, we use the O(V 2) greedy matching algorithm as a reasonable balance
between time complexity and performance. To match tuples, say t1 and t2
in Figure 3.3, the first attribute value of t1 is greedily matched against the
most similar attribute value of t2. Two attributes values are matched only if
the similarity exceeds a threshold value (we used an empirically determined
threshold of 0.6 in our experiments). Subsequently, the second attribute value
in the first tuple is matched against the most similar unmatched attribute value
in the second tuple and so on. The edges selected by this greedy matching step
are shown in solid lines in Figure 3.3. The agreement between the tuples is
calculated as the sum of the similarities of the individual matched values. The
two tuples are considered matching if they exceed a empirically determined
threshold of similarity.
The Fellagi-Saunter record linkage model [36] suggests that the attribute
values occurring less frequently are more indicative of the semantic similarity
between the tuples. For example, two entities with the common title The
Godfather are more likely to be denoting same book than two entities with
common format paperback). To account for this, we weight the similarities
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between the matched attributes in the step above as
S(t, t′) =
∑
vi,vj∈M wijSIM(vi, vj)√∑
vi,vj∈M w
2
ij
(3.9)
where vi,vj are attribute values of t and t
′ respectively, and wi,j is the weight
assigned to the match between vi and vj based on the mean inverse document
frequency of the tokens in vi and vj. Specifically, the wij’s are calculated as,
wij = log
(∑
k IDF ik
|vi|
)
log
(∑
l IDF jl
|vj|
)
(3.10)
where vi is the i
th attribute value and IDF ik is the inverse document frequency
of the kth token of the ith attribute value. This is similar to the weighting of
terms in TFIDF.
3.4.3 Result Set Similarity
The agreement between two result sets R1q and R2q from two sources for a
query q is defined as,
A(R1q, R2q) = arg max
M
∑
(t∈R1q ,t′∈R2q)∈M
S(t, t′) (3.11)
where M is the optimal matched pairs of tuples between R1q and R2q and
S(t, t′) are as calculated in Equation 3.9. Since this is again a bipartite match-
ing problem similar to Equation 3.8, we use a greedy matching. The first tuple
in R1q is matched greedily against the tuple with highest match in R2q. Subse-
quently, the second tuple in R1q is matched with the most similar unmatched
tuple in R2q and so on. The agreement between the two result sets is calculated
as the sum of the agreements between the matched tuples. The agreement thus
calculated is used in the Equation 3.4.
We calculate agreement between the top-k (with k = 5) answer sets of
the each query in the sampled set described in the subsection below. We
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stick to top-k results since most web information systems focus on providing
best answers in the top few positions (a reasonable strategy given that the
users rarely go below the top few results). The agreements of the answers
to the entire set of sampling queries is used in Equation 3.4 to compute the
agreement between the sources. Note that even though we used top-k answers,
the normalization against the answer set size in Equation 3.4 is required, since
the answer set sizes vary as some sources return less than k results to some
queries.
3.5 Sampling Sources
Web databases are typically non-cooperative, i.e. they do not share the statis-
tics of contents, or allow access to the entire data set. Thus, the agreement
graph must be computed over a sampled set. In this section we describe the
sampling strategy used for our experiments on web databases (see Section 3.7).
For sampling, we assume only a form based query interface allowing keyword
queries; similar to the query based sampling used for the non-cooperative text
databases [37].
For generating sampling queries, we use the publicly available book and
movie listings. We use two hundred queries each from book and movie domain
for sampling. To generate queries for the book domain, we randomly select two
hundred books from the New York Times yearly number one book listing from
the year 1940 to 2007 [38]. For the sampling query set of movie domain, we
use two hundred random movies from the second edition of New York Times
movie guide [39].
As keyword queries for sampling, we use partial titles of the books/movies.
We generate partial title queries by randomly deleting words from titles of
length more than one word. The probability of deletion of a word is set to 0.5.
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The use of partial queries is motivated by the fact that two sources are less
likely to agree with each other on partial title queries. This is because partial
titles are less constraining and thus result in a larger number of possible an-
swers compared to full title queries. Hence agreement on answers to partial
queries is more indicative of agreement between the sources as the probability
of agreement by chance of top-k answers is less for larger answer sets. (our ini-
tial experiments validated this assumption). The choice of deletion probability
to be 0.5 is based on cross-validation experiments.
We perform a query based sampling of database by sending the queries to
the title keyword search fields of the sources. The sampling is automated here,
but we wrote our own parsing rules to parse the result tuples from the returned
HTML pages. This parsing of tuples has been solved previously [29, 40, 41],
and can be automated (parsing is not required for Google Base experiments
as structured tuples are returned). This averaging and aggregation over num-
ber of queries is likely to increase the robustness of the overall agreement
computation against the problems in linking individual records.
3.6 Assessing Source Collusion
A potential problem for applying SourceRank is that sources may make copies
of themselves to boost their rankings. As the SourceRank becomes popular,
collusion is likely to be more severe problem as well [42]. This is similar to
the prevalence of link spam as the link analysis became a common ranking
method for the surface web. Considering this, we devise a method to measure
and compensate source collusion while computing SourceRank.
We measure the collusion of web databases on top-k answer sets, since
agreement is also computed on top-k answers. While computing the agreement
graph, we compensate for the source-collusion for the improved robustness
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of SourceRank. Two issues that complicate collusion detection are (i) even
non-colluding databases in the same domain may contain almost the same
data. For example, many movie sources may contain all Hollywood movies.
This means that two databases having similar data samples need not indicate
collusion (ii) top-k answers from even non-colluding databases in the same
domain are likely to be similar. For example, two movie databases are likely
to return all three movies in Godfather trilogy for the query Godfather. This
observation adds the complexity that even returning similar results on genuine
queries does not indicate collusion. The collusion measure should not classify
these genuine data and ranking correlations as collusion. On the other hand,
mirrors or near-mirrors with same data and ranking functions need to be
identified.
The basic intuition behind the collusion detection is that if two sources
return the same top-k answers to the queries with large number of possible
answers (e.g. queries containing only stop words), they are possibly colluding.
More formally, for two independently ranked sets of answers, the expected
agreement between the top-k answers E(Ak) (Ak is the agreement of top-k
results) is
E(Ak) =

k
n
(1− e) if k < n
(1− e) otherwise
(3.12)
where top-k answers are used to calculate agreement, size of the answer set is
n, and e is the error rate due to approximate matching. This means that for
queries with large number of answers (i.e. n  k as k is fixed) the expected
agreement between two independent sources is very low. As a corollary, if the
agreement between two sources on a large answer query is high, they are likely
to be colluding.
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To generate a set of queries with large answer sets, we fetched a set of two
hundred keywords with highest document frequencies from the crawl described
in the Section 3.5. Sources are probed with these queries. The agreement
between the answer sets are computed based on this crawl according to Equa-
tion 3.4. These agreements are seen as a measure of the collusion between
the sources. The agreement computed between the same two sources on the
samples based on genuine queries described in Section 3.5 is multiplied by
(1 − collusion) to get the adjusted agreement. Thus the weight of the edges
in Equation 3.5 is modified in this collusion-adjusted agreement graph as,
w(S1 → S2) = β + (1− β)× AQ(S1, S2)(1− collusion)|Q| (3.13)
These adjusted agreements are used for computing SourceRank for the exper-
iments below. We also provide a standalone evaluation of collusion measure
in Section 3.7.5.
3.7 Evaluations
In this section we evaluate the effectiveness of SourceRank (computed based on
collusion adjusted-agreement) as the basis for domain specific source selection
sensitive to relevance and trustworthiness. The top-k precision and discounted
cumulative gain (DCG) of SourceRank-base source selection are compared
with three existing methods: (i) Coverage based ranking used in relational
databases, (ii) CORI ranking used in text databases, and (iii) Google Product
search on Google Base.
3.7.1 Experimental Setup
We describe the dataset, test queries and baseline methods in our experiments
in the following three sections.
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3.7.1.1 Databases
We performed the evaluations in two vertical domains—sellers of books and
movies (movies include DVD, Blu-Ray etc.). We used three sets of data
bases— (i) a set of standalone online data sources (e.g. Amazon) (ii) hundreds
of data sources collected via Google Base (iii) a million IMDB records [43].
The databases listed in TEL-8 database list in the UIUC deep web interface
repository [44] are used for online evaluations (every source in the repository
after removing non-working ones). We used sixteen movie databases and sev-
enteen book databases from the TEL-8 repository. In addition to these, we
added five video sharing databases to the movie domain and five library sources
to the book domain. These out-of-domain sources are added to increase the
variance in source quality. If all sources are of similar quality, different rank-
ings do not make a difference.
Google Base is a collection of data from a large number of web databases,
with an API-based access to data returning ranked results [28]. The Google
Products Search works on Google Base. Each source in Google Base has a
source id. For selecting domain sources, we probed the Google Base with a
set of ten book/movie titles as queries. From the first 400 results to each
query, we collected source ids; and considered them as a source belonging to
that particular domain. This way, we collected a set of 675 book sources and
209 movie sources for our evaluations. Sampling is performed through Google
Base API’s as described in Section 3.5.
3.7.1.2 Test Queries
Test query sets for both book and movie domains are selected from different
lists than the sampling query set, so that test and sampling sets are disjoint.
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The movie and book titles in several categories are obtained from a movie
sharing site and a favorite books list. We generated queries by randomly re-
moving words from the movie/book titles with probability of 0.5—in the same
way as described for the sampling queries above. We used partial titles as the
test queries, since typical web user queries are partial descriptions of objects.
The number of queries are used in different experiments varies between 50 to
80, so as to attain 95% confidence intervals.
3.7.1.3 Baseline Methods
Coverage: Coverage is computed as the mean relevance of the top-5 results
to the sampling queries described in Section 3.5 above. For assessing the
relevance of the results, we used the SoftTF-IDF with Jaro-Winkler similarity
between the query and the results (recall that the same similarity measure is
used for the agreement computation).
CORI: To collect source statistics for CORI [6], we used terms with highest
document frequency from the sample crawl data describe in Section 3.5 as
crawling queries. Callan et al. [37] observe that good performance is obtained
by using highest document frequency terms in related text databases as queries
to crawl. Similarly, we used two hundred high tuple-frequency queries and
used top-10 results for each query to create resource descriptions for CORI.
We used the same parameters as found to be optimal by Callan et al. [6].
CORI is used as the baseline, since the later developments like ReDDE [45]
depend on database size estimation by sampling, and it is not demonstrated
that this size estimation would work on the ranked results from web sources.
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3.7.2 Relevance Evaluation
This section describes our empirical relevance evaluation. We give the details
of manual labeling or results. Subsequently, we describe the experiments on a
smaller set of online databases and a larger set of Google Base sources.
3.7.2.1 Assessing Relevance
To assess the relevance, we used randomly chosen queries from test queries
described above in Section 3.7.1. These queries are issued to the top-k sources
selected by different methods. The results returned are manually classified
as relevant and non-relevant. The first author performed the classification of
the tuples, since around 14,000 tuples were to be classified as relevant and
irrelevant. The classification is simple and almost rule based. For example,
assume that the query is Wild West, and the original movie name from which
the partial query is generated is Wild Wild West (as described in the test
query description in Section 3.7.1). If the result tuple refers to the movie
Wild Wild West (i.e. DVD, Blu-Ray etc. of the movie), then the result is
classified as relevant, otherwise classified as irrelevant. Similarly for books, if
the result is the queried book to sell, it is classified as relevant and otherwise it
is classified as irrelevant. As an insurance against biased classification by the
author, we randomly mixed tuples from all methods in a single file; so that the
author did not know which method each result came from while he does the
classification. All the evaluations are performed to differentiate SourceRank
precision and DCG from competing methods by non-overlapping confidence
intervals at a significance level of 95% or more.
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3.7.2.2 Online Sources
We compared mean top-5 precision and DCG of top-4 Sources (we avoided
normalization in NDCG since ranked lists are of equal length). Five meth-
ods, namely Coverage, SourceRank, CORI, and two linear combinations of
SourceRank with CORI and Coverage—(0.1 × SourceRank + 0.9 × CORI)
and (0.5×Coverage+ 0.5×SourceRank)—are compared. The higher weight
for CORI in CORI-SourceRank combination is to compensate for the higher
statistical dispersion (measured by mean absolute deviation) of SourceRank
scores compared to CORI scores.
The results of the top-4 source selection experiments in movie and books
domain are shown in Figure 3.4a and 3.4b. For both the domains, SourceRank
clearly outperforms the Coverage and CORI. For the movie domain, SourceR-
ank increases precision over Coverage by 73.0% (i.e. ((0.395− 0.228)/0.228)×
100) and over CORI by 29.3%. DCG@5 of SourceRank is higher by 90.4%
and and 20.8% over Coverage and CORI respectively. For the books domain,
SourceRank improves both precision and DCG over CORI as well as Coverage
by approximately 30%. The SourceRank outperforms standalone CORI and
Coverage in both precision and DCG at a confidence level of 95%. Though
the primary target of the evaluation is not differentiating SourceRank and
combinations, it may be worth mentioning that SourceRank outperforms the
combinations at a confidence level more than 90% in most cases. Though this
may be counter-intuitive at the first thought, keep in mind that the selected
sources return the results based on the query based relevance. Hence the re-
sults from SourceRank-only source selection implicitly account for the query
similarity. When combining again with the query-relevance based method like
CORI, we are possibly over-weighting the query similarity.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of precision and DCG of top-4 online sources selected
by Coverage, SourceRank, CORI, Combination of SourceRank with Coverage
(SR-Coverage) and CORI (SR-CORI) for movies and books .
As a note on the seemingly low precision values, these are mean relevance
of the top-5 results. Many of the queries used have less than five possible
relevant answers (e.g. a book title query may have only paperback and hard
cover for the book as relevant answers). But since the web databases always
tend to return full first page of results average top-5 precision is bound to be
low. For example, for a search engine always returning one relevant result in
top−5, the top−5 precision will be only 0.2.
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3.7.2.3 Google Base
In these experiments we tested if the precision of Google Base search results
can be improved by combining SourceRank with the default Google Base rele-
vance ranking. Google Base tuple ranking is applied on top of source selection
by SourceRank and compared with standalone Google Base Ranking. This
combination of source selection with Google Base is required for performance
comparison, since source ranking cannot be directly compared with the tuple
ranking of Google Base. For the book domain, we calculated SourceRank for
675 book domain sources selected as described in
Section 3.7.1. Out of these 675 sources, we selected top-67 (10%) sources
based on SourceRank. Google Base is made to query only on this top-67
Sources, and the precision of top−5 tuples is compared with that of Google
Base Ranking without this source selection step. Similarly for the movie do-
main, top-21 sources are selected. DCG is not computed for these experiments
since all the results are ranked by Google Base ranking, hence ranking order
comparison is not required.
In Figure 3.5a and 3.5b, the GBase is the standalone Google Base rank-
ing. GBase-Domain is the Google Base ranking searching only in the domain
sources selected using our query probing. For example, in Figure 3.5b, Google
Base is made to search only on the 675 book domain sources used in our exper-
iments. For the plots labeled SourceRank and Coverage, first top-10% sources
are selected using SourceRank and Coverage; and then the results retrieved
from the selected sources are ranked by Google Base. SourceRank outper-
forms all other methods (confidence levels are 95% or more). For the movie
domain, SourceRank precision exceeds Google Base by 38% and coverage by
23%. For books the differences are 53% and 25% with Google Base and Cov-
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of top-5 precision of results returned by SourceRank,
Google Base and Coverage for movies and books.
erage respectively. The small difference between the Google Base and Google
Base-domain has low statistical significance (below 80%) hence not conclusive.
3.7.3 Trustworthiness Evaluation
In the next set of experiments, we evaluate the ability of SourceRank to elimi-
nate untrustworthy sources. For tuples, corruption in the attribute values not
specified in the query manifests as untrustworthy results, whereas mismatch
in attributes values specified in the query manifests as the irrelevant results.
Since the title is the specified attribute for our queries, we corrupted the at-
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Figure 3.6: Decrease in ranks of the sources with increasing source corruption
levels for movies and books. The SourceRank reduces almost linearly with
corruption, while CORI and Coverage are insensitive to the corruption.
tributes other than the title values of the source crawls. Values are replaced
by random strings for corruption. SourceRank, Coverage and CORI ranks are
recomputed using these corrupted crawls, and reduction in ranks of the cor-
rupted sources are calculated. The experiment is repeated fifty times for each
corruption level, reselecting sources to corrupt randomly for each repetition.
The percentage of reduction for a method is computed as the mean reduction
in these runs. Since CORI ranking is query specific, the decrease in CORI
rank is calculated as the average decrease in rank over ten test queries.
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Figure 3.7: Time to compute agreement graph against number of sources.
The results of the experiments for movies and books domain are shown in
Figure 3.6. The Coverage and CORI are oblivious of the corruption, and do
not lower rank of the corrupted sources. Significantly, this susceptibility to
corruption is a deficiency of any query similarity based relevance assessment,
since they are totally insensitive to the attributes not specified in the query.
On the other hand, the SourceRank of the corrupted sources reduces almost
linearly with the corruption level. This corruption-sensitivity of SourceRank
would be helpful in solving the trust problems we discussed in the introduction
(e.g. the solution manual with the same title and low non-existent prices etc).
3.7.4 Timing Evaluation
We already know that random walk computation is feasible at web scale [10].
Hence for the timing experiments, we focus on the agreement graph computa-
tion time. The agreement computation is O(n2k2) where n is the number of
sources and top-k result set from each source is used for calculating the agree-
ment graph (k is a constant factor in practice). We performed all experiments
on a 3.16 GHz, 3.25 GB RAM Intel Desktop PC with Windows XP Operating
System.
Figure 3.7 shows the variation of agreement graph computation time of the
600 of the book sources from Google Base. As expected from time complexity
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formulae above, the time increases in second order polynomial time. Consider-
ing that the agreement computation is offline, the deep web scale computation
should be feasible. In practice, sources in widely separated domains are not
likely to show any significant agreement. Hence we may avoid computing
agreement between all pairs of sources based on the domains; significantly
reducing computation time. Further, note that the agreement graph compu-
tation is easy to parallelize. The different processing nodes can be assigned to
compute a subset of agreement values between the sources. These agreement
values can be computed in isolation—without inter-process communication to
pass intermediate results between the nodes. Consequently, we will achieve
a near-linear reduction in computation time with the number of computation
nodes.
3.7.5 Collusion Evaluation
In this section we perform a standalone ground truth evaluation collusion
detection and the adjusted agreement described in Section 3.6. Since the
ground truth—degree of collusion—of the online databases is unknown, these
evaluations are performed using controlled ranking functions on a data set of a
million records from IMDB [43]. We need to build two databases with varying
degree of collusion between them. For this, all the records are replicated to
create two databases of one million records each. For a query, the set of tuples
are fetched based on the keyword match and ranked. To implement ranking,
a random score is assigned to each tuple and tuples are sorted on this score
(every tuple is present in both these databases). If these scores for a given
tuple in two databases are independent random numbers, the rankings are
completely independent (hence databases have zero collusion). If the score for
a tuple is the same for both the databases, rankings are completely correlated
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Figure 3.8: Variation of Collusion, Agreement and Adjusted Agreement with
rank correlations. Adjusted Agreement is Agreement× (1− collusion).
(full collusion or mirrors). To achieve mid levels of correlations between the
sources, weighted combinations of two independent random numbers are used
for ranking results.
Figure 3.8 shows the variation of collusion, agreement, and adjusted agree-
ment with the correlation of the two databases. The correlation is progres-
sively reduced from left to right. At the left, they are complete mirrors with
the same ranking and data, and as we go right, the rank correlation decreases.
As we observe in the graph, when the databases have the same rankings, the
collusion and agreements are the same, making the adjusted agreement zero.
This clearly makes the adjusted agreement between mirrors (databases with
the same data and ranking) and near mirrors zero. Even for a small reduction
in the rank correlation, the collusion falls rapidly, whereas agreement reduces
more gradually. Consequently the adjusted agreement increases rapidly. This
rapid increase avoids canceling agreement between the genuine sources. In
particular, the low sensitivity of the adjusted agreement in the correlation
range 0.9 to 0 shows its immunity to the genuine correlations of databases.
At low correlations, the adjusted agreement is almost the same as the original
agreement as desired. These experiments satisfy the two desiderata of collu-
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sion detection we discussed in Section 3.6. The method penalizes mirrors and
near mirrors, whereas genuine agreement between the sources is kept intact.
3.8 Chapter Summery
The sheer number and uncontrolled nature of the sources in the deep web
leads to significant variability among the sources, and necessitates a more ro-
bust measure of relevance sensitive to source popularity and trustworthiness.
To this end, we proposed SourceRank, a global measure derived solely from
the degree of agreement between the results returned by individual sources.
SourceRank plays a role akin to PageRank but for data sources. Unlike PageR-
ank however, it is derived from implicit endorsement (measured in terms of
agreement) rather than from explicit hyperlinks. For added robustness of the
ranking, we assess and compensate for the source collusion while computing
the agreements. Our comprehensive empirical evaluation shows that SourceR-
ank improves relevance sources selected compared to existing methods and
effectively removes corrupted sources. We also demonstrated that combining
SourceRank with Google Product search ranking significantly improves the
quality of the results.
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Chapter 4
Topic-Sensitive Source Ranking
Deep web sources may contain data from multiple topics (domains). For such
multi-domain sources, the quality of the data in different domains may vary
significantly. For example, Amazon may return high quality results for books,
but may return low quality results for furniture. The quality of a source spe-
cific to a topic is best indicated by the agreement by sources in the domain.
Haveliwala [13] has shown that the topic-specific endorsement improves search
for the surface web. This consideration is likely to be more significant for the
deep web, since sources contain records very specific to domains (e.g. books,
movies etc.). Hence to customize SourceRank for the multi-domain deep web,
we introduce topic sensitive SourceRank (TSR). In this chapter we describe the
sampling and computation for TSR—SourceRank computed primarily based
on the agreement by the sources in the same topic. We start by describing
topical sampling of sources and TSR computation. Section 4.3 describes the
soft-classification of user queries into multiple domains. Subsequently we de-
scribe the system architecture, and empirically compare TSR with existing
measures and topic-oblivious SourceRank.
4.1 Topical Sampling of Sources
Unlike the SourceRank, the sampling for the topical SourceRank is domain
specific. We used different sampling queries for different domains. For exam-
ple, the TSR for movies is computed based on the movie sampling queries. All
other details of sampling is similar to the SourceRank sampling described in
Section 3.5
For TSR computations we used sources spanning across four domains—
Books, Movies, Cameras and Music. Sampling method is same as described
for SourceRank in Section 3.5. Sampling queries are from New York Times best
sellers [38] (books), Open Directory DVD Listing [46] (movies), pbase.com [47]
(cameras), and top-100 albums in 1986-2010 [48] (music)
Similar to the SourceRank sampling, words are deleted from titles with 0.5
probability to get the partial key word queries. All these queries are sent to
every source and top-k (we used k = 5) answers returned are collected. Note
that the sources are not explicitly classified into topics. The idea is that if a
source gives high quality answers for queries in a topic, the other sources in
the topic are likely to agree with that source. After tuples are retrieved, we
compute the agreement between the sources as described below.
4.2 Computing Topic Sensitive Ranking
For the Topic-sensitive SourceRank (TSR), a source-quality score is computed
for each topic of the source. We compute the source quality score for a topic
based solely on the source crawls corresponding to the sampling queries of the
topic. For example, for computing movie TSRs, we compute the agreement
graph (described in Section 3.2) based on the crawl obtained by using the
movie sampling queries described above in Section 4.1. After generating the
agreement graph, source quality score for this topic are computed based on
the static visit probability of a weighted Markov random walk on the graph
as described in Section 3.3.
The acceptability of computation timings of TSR is directly inferable from
the computation of the SourceRank. The first step of computing TSR—
computing the agreement graph—is shown to be scalable in Section 3.7.4.
The only difference for the TSR is that we have multiple source graphs, one
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corresponding to each topic. Hence the total time to compute the graphs in-
creases linearly with the number of topics. The random walk computation is
widely used [10] and known to be scalable. Besides, note that the TSR com-
putation is offline, and does not add to the valuable query time. We do not
perform separate timing experiments for TSR.
Depending on the target topic of the query, we need to use the right topic
TSRs to select the best sources. For example, we need to select sources rank-
ing higher in the movie TSR for a movie query. Realistically, the membership
of a query in a topic will be probabilistic. The section below describes com-
bining topic TSRs depending on the probability of membership of the query
in different topics.
4.3 Topical Classification of Queries
Depending on the target domain user has in mind for the query, we need to
use the TSR of the right domain to rank sources. For example, we need to
select source based on the movie TSR for a movie query like “The Godfather
Trilogy”. The first step in query processing is to identify the query-topic i.e.
the likelihood of the query belonging to topic-classes. We formulate this as
a soft-classification problem. For a user query q and a set of representative
topic-classes ci ∈ C, the goal is to find the probability of topic membership
of q in each of these topics ci. A Na¨ıve Bayes Classifier (NBC) is used for
this topical query classification. We describe training data and classification
approach in the sections below.
4.3.1 Training Data
For topic-descriptions to train our classifier, we use query based sampling
similar to the sampling described in Section 4.1. Same set of sampling methods
and list of queries have been used. But instead of generating partial queries by
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deleting words randomly, we use full titles as queries. Full title query crawls
is less noisy and is found to be giving better classification accuracy.
4.3.2 Classification
Realistically, query classification to domains will be probabilistic at best, since
deterministically classifying queries to a particular domain is hard. Hence we
adopt a soft classification approach using a multinomial NBC with maximum
likelihood estimates. For a query q, we compute the probability of membership
of q in topic ci as,
P (ci|q) = P (q|ci)P (ci)
P (q)
∝ P (ci)
∏
j
P (qj|ci) (4.1)
where qj is the j
th term of q.
P (ci) can be set based on past query logs, but here we assume uniform
probabilities for topic-classes. Hence the above equation reduces to,
P (ci|q) ∝
∏
j
P (qj|ci) (4.2)
P (qj|ci) is computed as the ratio of number of occurrences of qj in the training
data corresponding to cj to the total number of words.
After computing the topic probabilities of the query, we compute the query
specific score of sources by combining the topical scores. For a source sk final
combined score TSRkq specific to the query is given by,
TSRkq =
∑
i
P (ci|q)TSRki (4.3)
Sources are ranked based on TSRkq for query q.
4.4 System Architecture
Figure 4.1 provides an overview of our system. Similar to the SourceRank
system, it consists of two main parts. An offline component which uses the
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Figure 4.1: Multi-topics deep web integration system combining online query
classification and TSR based source selection.
crawled data for computing topic-sensitive SourceRanks and topic-descriptions.
The online component consists of a classifier which performs user query-
classification using the topic-descriptions. The source selector uses the query-
classification information to combine TSRs in order to generate query specific
ranking of sources.
The main difference with the SourceRank system described in Section 5.4.1
are the topical-crawling and query classification components in the architec-
ture. The topic crawlers get the samples required for the query classifier train-
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ing. The agreement crawlers perform the topic specific sampling required for
computation of topical source graphs. At the query time, the query classifier
classify the query to topics, and source selector ranks the sources by mixing
the scores corresponding the query domains.
4.5 Experimental Evaluation
We compared the precision of TSR with other source selection methods. The
experiments are performed on a large set of multi-topic deep-web sources.
These sources correspond to four representative topic classes - camera, book,
movie, and music.
4.5.1 Source Data Set
The deep-web source data was collected from Google Base. For selecting
sources for multi-topic deep-web environment, we probed Google Base with a
set of 40 queries. These 40 queries contained a mix of camera model names,
book, movie, and music album titles. From the first 200 results of each query,
we collected the source identifiers and considered them as a source belonging
to our multi-topic deep web environment. We collected a total of 1440 deep
web sources: 276 camera, 556 book, 572 movie, and 281 music sources.
4.5.2 Test Queries
Test query set contained a mix of queries from all four topic-classes. Test
queries were selected such that there is no overlap with the sampling queries.
Queries were generated by randomly removing words from camera names,
book, movie and music album titles with probability 0.5, similar to the sam-
pling queries described in Section 4.1. Number of test queries are varied for
different topics to achieve statistically significant (0.95) difference with base-
lines.
60
4.5.3 Baseline Source Selection Methods
TSR is compared with agreement based and query similarity based source
selection methods. The agreement based methods consider the source agree-
ment, and hence the trustworthiness and relevance of the sources are taken
into account. On the other hand, pure query similarity measures like CORI [6]
assesses the source quality based on similarity of content with the user query;
hence agnostic to the trust and importance. The CORI and the Undiffer-
entiated SourceRank described below may be considered as the alternative
approaches to multi-topic search derived from the existing methods.
The baseline methods used are:
Undifferentiated SourceRank (USR): The USR is computed without dif-
ferentiating between the domains similar to the single-domain SourceR-
ank. A single agreement graph is created for the entire set sources; using
the sampling queries for all the domains. On this undifferentiated graph,
a single source quality scores for each source is computed.
CORI: We compared with standalone CORI (described in Section 3.7.1.3)
as well as evaluated combination of CORI with agreement based source
selection.
Google Base: We compared with two-versions of Google Base. Stand along
Google Base and Google Base Dataset—Google Base restricted to search
only on our crawled sources similar to SourceRank evaluations above (i.e.
GBase-Domain in Section 3.7.2).
4.5.4 Relevance Evaluation
Evaluation is similar to the SourceRank evaluation on Google Base sources.
Using our source selection strategies, we selected top-k sources for every test
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query and restricted Google Base query only on these top-k sources. We ex-
perimented with three different values of k—top-10 sources, top-5% and top-
10% sources—and found that best precision was obtained for k=10. We used
Google Base’s tuple ranking for ordering the resulting tuples and return top-5
tuples in response to test queries. After ranking the tuples, the methods can
be directly compared with each other.
For assessing the relevance, we used the test queries described above. The
queries were issued to top-k sources selected by different source selection meth-
ods. The top-5 results returned were manually classified as relevant or irrel-
evant. The classification of query to relevant and irrelevant is performed as
described for SourceRank evaluation in Section 3.7
4.5.4.1 Comparison with Query Similarity
We compared TSR with the baselines described above. Instead of using stan-
dalone TSR, we combined TSR with query similarity based CORI measure.
We experimented with different values of weighted combination of CORI and
TSR, and found that TSR× 0.1 + CORI × 0.9 gives best precision. For rest
of this section we denote this combination as TSR(0.9). Note that the higher
weightage of CORI compared to TSR is to compensate for the fact that TSR
scores have much higher dispersion compared to CORI scores, and not an
indication of relative importance of these measures.
Our first set of experiments compare precision of TSR(0.1) with the query
similarity based measures i.e. CORI, Google Base and Google Base Dataset.
The results for individual domains and the aggregate mean across the do-
mains are illustrated in Figure 4.2. Note that for every domain as well as for
the aggregate the improvement in precision by TSR(0.1) considerable as the
precision improves up to 85% over baselines.
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of top−5 precision of TSR(0.1) (TSR×0.1+CORI×
0.9) with query similarity based CORI and Google Base for different domains,
and aggregate mean precision across the domains
4.5.4.2 Comparison with Agreement
In the next set of experiments, we compared TSR(0.1) with standalone USR
and USR(0.9) (i.e. USR × 0.1 + CORI × 0.9). Note that USR(0.9)—linear
combination of USR with a query specific relevance measure—is a highly in-
tuitive way of extending domain oblivious USR for the multi-domain deep
web search. Note that this combination is isomorphic to the linear combina-
tion of domain oblivious static PageRank and query similarity for the surface
web [10].
The results for individual domains and the mean aggregate are illustrated
in Figure 4.3. For three out of four topic-classes (Camera, Movies, and Mu-
sic), TSR(0.1) out-performs USR(0.1) and USR with confidence levels 0.95
or more. For books we found no statistical significant difference between
USR(0.1) and TSR(0.1). This may be attributed to the fact that the source
set was dominated by large number of good quality book sources, biasing
the ranking towards book domain. Further, we analyzed comparable perfor-
mance of domain independent USR and domain specific USR(0.1) for three
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of top−5 precision of TSR(0.1) (TSR×0.1+CORI×
0.9) with agreement based USR and USR(0.1) (0.1× USR + 0.9× CORI)
domains: music, movies and books (though this comparison is not the focus
of our evaluation). This analysis revealed that there are many multi-domain
sources providing good quality results for books, movies and music domains
(e.g. Amazon, eBay). These versatile sources occupy top positions in USR
returning reasonable results for USR.
4.6 Chapter Summery
We attempted multi-topic source selection sensitive to trustworthiness and im-
portance for the deep web. Although SourceRank is shown to be effective in
solving this problem in single topic environments, there is a need for extend-
ing SourceRank to multiple-topics. We introduced topic-sensitive SourceRank
(TSR) as an efficient and effective technique for evaluating source importance
in a multi-topic deep web environment. We combined TSR source selection
with a Na¨ıve Bayes Classifier for queries to build our final multi-topic deep
web search system. Our experiments on more than thousand sources spanning
across multiple topics show that a TSR-based source selection is highly effec-
tive in extending SourceRank for multi-topic deep web search. TSR is able
to significantly out-perform query similarity based retrieval selection models.
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Comparison with agreement-based source selection models showed that TSR
improves precision over topic oblivious SourceRank.
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Chapter 5
Ranking Results and System Architecture
For the end-to-end deep web integration and search, the returned results by
selected sources have to be combined and re-ranked. Given the open and
adversarial nature of the deep web sources, this re-ranking must be prepared to
go beyond merging of different rank lists. Otherwise, sources may manipulate
their rankings to improve the global rankings of their-own results, similar
to the current search engine marketing methods. More generally, the search
engine ranking ideally be independent of any parameters easily manipulable
by the sources to be robust. To support this, we formulate a result ranking
method—namely TupleRak—based on the agreement analysis.
5.1 Building Result Agreement Graph
We compute the result quality at the query time. Query time computation
increases the search response time, compared to pre-computing quality for the
entire search space of records (i.e. similar to the surface web search). However,
unlike the surface web, a centralized index and pre-computing is infeasible for
the deep web. Number of difficulties including hardness of crawling the full
data set of non-cooperative sources, size of the deep web amounting to many
times of the surface web [2], and the dynamic content make pre-computation
infeasible.
We fetch the top−k results (we used k = 5 for our system and experiments)
from the selected sources for ranking. A primary idea for ranking sensitive to
importance is the basic voting by counting number of sources returning each
tuple. But this simple voting is infeasible for the deep web due to the non-
common domain problem illustrated in Figure 3.1. Hence we compute the
agreement between the tuples as described in Section 3.4. We represent the
agreement between the tuples as a graph with individual results as vertices.
Note that we do not consider the similarity between the tuples returned by
the same source for the result-agreement graph. This is to prevent a source
from boosting rank of a tuple by returning multiple copies.
5.2 Computing Ranking Scores
In the result-agreement graph, as simple ranking is in the order of first order
agreements—i.e. the sum of the in-degrees of the tuples. Stepping one level
deeper, second order agreement considers the common friends two tuples have.
As we compute higher and higher order agreements, the accuracies as well as
the computation timings increase. Since the result ranking is at the query time,
lower computation time is important. We empirically compared precisions and
convergence of second order agreement and random walk. For fifty test queries,
the mean number of iterations to converge for random walk was found to be
16.4 (note that second order agreement takes two iterations). The difference
in precision between the two was statistically insignificant (significance levels
less than 0.5). Hence we use second order agreement for reduced computation
time.
To describe the computation of the second order agreement, let the result-
agreement graph be represented as a matrix A, where the entry aij represents
the edge weight from the tuple j to the tuple i. We compute the second
order agreement matrix as S = ATA (A is asymmetric). Semantically second
order agreement captures not just that the two tuples are agreeing, but also
that they have common friends (friends are the tuples agreeing with a tuple).
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Finally we obtain the score ri of a tuple ti as the sum of the values the i
th row
i.e ri =
∑
j sij; and tuples are ranked in the order of ri.
5.3 Evaluations
We compared the precision and trustworthiness of the result ranking with ex-
isting methods and systems. We start by evaluating standalone result ranking.
Further, since result ranking will be used in conjunction with the SourceRank
in real systems, we evaluate the residual increase in precision by the result
ranking in addition to the improvement by SourceRank.
We used 209 movie sources in Google Base described in Section 3.7.1 for
these experiments. The creation of the test query set and the labeling of
the results as relevant and irrelevant are performed in the same manner as de-
scribed in Section 3.7.1 as well. Top-5 precision, NDCG@5 and trustworthiness
of results by the proposed ranking are compared with those of (i) Relevance
measured as the query similarity with tuples (using SoftTFIDF with Jaro-
Winkler described in Section 3.4). (ii) the default relevance ranking of Google
Base.
5.3.1 Relevance Results
The relevance improvements of the standalone result ranking, and in com-
bination with SourceRank are evaluated in separate experiments. Sufficient
number of queries are used to differentiate both NDCG and precision of the
proposed ranking with non-overlapping confidence intervals at a significance
level of 0.95.
In Figure 5.1a, top−5 results from sources are selected for each query.
These results are combined and re-ranked using the three ranking methods.
The comparison of top-5 precision and NDCG are shown in Figure 5.1a. Preci-
sion is improved by 81% over Google Base and 61% over query similarity; and
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Figure 5.1: Comparison of top-5 precisions and NDCG of TupleRank, Query
Similarity, and Google Base (a) without source selection. (b) with SourceRank
based source selection.
NDCG by 46% and 26% respectively over Google Base and query similarity.
Note that the apparent difference in accuracy between the query similarity and
Google Base is not conclusive as the difference is found to be of low statistical
significance.
We used top-5 results since most web databases try to provide best preci-
sion for the top slots, as very few users go below top results [49]. The ranking
is applicable for other values of k as well. One factor in fixing k is that larger
k will increase the number of tuples to be ranked, thus increasing the ranking
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Figure 5.2: Corruption of top-5 results of the proposed result ranking and
query similarity with increasing result corruption levels.
time. Another factor is the number of sources searched. As the number of
sources increases, fetching fewer top results from each source is sufficient to
compose a combined rank list in general. Hence depending on the number of
sources, ranking time constraints and other application requirements the value
of k may be varied for different searches.
The second set of experiments evaluated precision improvements when re-
sult ranking is combined with SourceRank. We selected the top 10% sources
using SourceRank, and top-5 results from these selected sources are combined
and ranked by the proposed ranking method. For the results shown in Fig-
ure 5.1b, relevance is improved over the Google Base and Query Similarity
by 30 to 90%. Not surprisingly, the precision and NDCG of all the methods
increase over those without source selection (Figure 5.1a).
5.3.2 Trust Results
Similar to the trust evaluation for the SourceRank described in Section 3.7.3,
we corrupted a randomly selected subset of tuples by replacing attributes
not specified in the query. After corrupting, tuples are ranked using Query
Similarity and the proposed ranking. Robustness to corruption of ranking
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Figure 5.3: System Architectural Diagram. The online component contains
processing steps at query time. Both the crawling and search are parallelized.
(URL of the system is http://factal.eas.asu.edu).
is measured as the number of corrupted tuples in the top−5 results. The
experiment is repeated for 50 queries in each corruption level and the results
are shown in Figure 5.2. The query similarity is oblivious to the corruption—
as the fraction of corrupted tuples in the top−5 is almost the same as the
corruption level. On the other hand, proposed result ranking is highly robust
to corruption, as all corrupted tuples are removed until 70% of the results
are corrupted. At higher levels, corruption of the top-5 tuples are bound to
increase since there would be less than five uncorrupt tuples for many queries
(e.g. at corruption level one, any ranking method will have all the top-5 tuples
corrupted).
5.4 Factal System
The proposed source and result rankings are implemented in a vertical search
engine namely Factal (URL: http://factal.eas.asu.edu/). Sources are selected
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(a) Google product search (b) Factal
Figure 5.4: Comparison of results to the query Godfather Trilogy from (a)
Google Product Search and (b) Factal. None of the top results of Google
Products refer to the classic Godfather, whereas many results in Factal in-
cluding top result are correct.
using the SourceRank and the results are ranked using the proposed result
ranking.
5.4.1 Factal Architecture
The system shown in Figure 5.3 has an offline component and an online compo-
nent. The offline component crawls the sources and computes the SourceRank.
The online component selects the sources to search based on the SourceRank,
retrieve, and rank the results at query time. Factal searches in the book
and the movie domains. Search space contains 22 standalone online sources
in each domain, along with 610 book sources and 209 movie sources in the
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Figure 5.5: Sample book search results for the query Database Ullman in
Factal
Google Base1. Sources are crawled using sampling method described in Sec-
tion 3.5. For online sources one thread per data base is used for crawling, and
for Google Base we used forty threads (maximum acceptable for Google Base).
To process the queries, the top-k sources with highest SourceRank are
selected. We set the value of k at five for the online sources and 10% of the
total number of sources for the google base. Queries are dispatched to these
sources in parallel spawning a separate thread for each source. Top-5 results
are fetched from each source, and the results are combined and re-ranked using
the proposed result ranking.
5.4.2 Demonstration Scenarios
We demonstrate effectiveness of Factal by multiple screenshots. This screen-
shots include the Factal search results as well as comparison results from our
1Google Base API was shutdown lately, Factal search only online databases now.
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Figure 5.6: Comparing trustworthiness of result of SourceRank and baseline
methods. The corrupted results are marked as red based on the ground truth.
demonstration system [50]. The screenshots demonstrate improved precision,
trustworthiness and importance of the results.
5.4.2.1 Precision and Importance
Figure 5.4 shows the comparison of Factal results with Google Product search.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the current deep web search solution has
the problem of showing trivial results at the top. In Figure 5.4, none of the
top results by Google product search refers to the classic godfather movie or
book. On the other hand the top factal results refer to the classic godfather
results. This is a direct implication of the fact that the SoruceRank and the
proposed result ranking are capable of ranking important results high.
Screenshot in Figure 5.5 shows another example from books domain in
Factal. The query Database Ullman returns the database book from multiple
vendors. Note that even though the diversity is not explicitly considered in the
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ranking, the results are diverse due to the nature of the search space. Though
the titles repeat, these are different vendors providing different prices. This
redundancy is beneficial for applications like comparison shopping.
5.4.2.2 Trustworthiness
Figure 5.6 illustrates trustworthiness of the proposed source and result ranking.
We set up databases using tuples crawled from Google Base, and corrupted
them to varying degrees. Subsequently, we compute SourceRank, Coverage
and CORI ranks for each of the databases, and compare the search results from
each method. The screenshot shows the layout of the results presented. The
corrupted tuples are marked with red background, for an easy interpretation.
The left pane shows the results from SourceRank and right pane shows the
results from CORI or Coverage—as selected by the user. The corruption levels
of the results are displayed separately in addition to the color coding.
The system response time is found to be in the acceptable. For the in-
tegrated online search—where the queries are routed to the selected online
databases—the responses times were found to be less than a second in most
cases. Thus the Factal system demonstrates the feasibility of the integration
approach in the deep web, in addition to the effectiveness of the proposed
source and result ranking in assessing the trustworthiness and importance of
sources and results.
5.5 Chapter Summery
We address the problem of ranking the results returned by the selected sources.
Similar to the SourceRank, we propose a method (TupleRank) to rank the
results based on the second order agreement. Our evaluations show that the
method is effective in capturing the importance and trustworthiness of the
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results. TupleRank significantly improves both precision and trustworthiness
of the results compared to the existing ranking methods.
We implement an end-to-end deep web integration system Factal incorpo-
rating both SourceRank and TupleRank. The system architecture and sample
results are presented, along with the comparison with the existing systems.
Result samples comparing both trustworthiness and relevance of the system
are presented. The examples clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed source and result ranking methods, in addition to the feasibility of an
integration based search in the deep web.
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Chapter 6
Ad Ranking
Having described the deep web ranking in the preceding chapters, we consider
ranking of sponsored search results. We start by deriving an optimal ranking
function based on the user click model. Next, we generalize the ranking to
both ads and documents. A taxonomy of rankings based on the specific as-
sumptions on the click models and utilities are presented. Subsequently we
associate a pricing with the ranking, designing a complete auction mechanism.
We prove existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the proposed
mechanism. The properties of the equilibria are analyzed and compared with
the VCG mechanism. Subsequently we analyze the problem of optimizing
ranking considering diversity of the results. We prove that the optimal rank-
ing considering diversity is intractable even for basic formulations of diversity.
Finally we run a number of simulation experiments to quantify the difference in
profits by the proposed ranking. The experiments suggest considerable profit
improvements by the proposed ranking, and confirm the profit predictions by
our analysis.
6.1 Click Model
Ranking functions attempt to optimiz utilities based on the click model of
users. For our ranking, we assume a basic user click model in which the web
user browses the entity list in ranked order, as shown in Figure 6.1. At every
result entity, the user may:
1. Click the result entity with perceived relevance C(e). We define the
perceived relevance as the probability of clicking the entity ei having seen
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Figure 6.1: User click model. The labels are the view probabilities and ei
denotes the entity at the ith position
ei i.e. C(ei) = P (click(ei)|view(ei)). Note that the Click Through Rate
(CTR) defined in ad placement is the same as the perceived relevance
defined here [16].
2. Abandon browsing the result list with abandonment probability γ(ei).
γ(ei) is defined as the probability of abandoning the search at ei having
seen ei. i.e. γ(ei) = P (abandonment(ei)|view(ei)).
3. Go to the next entity in the result list with probability [1−(C(ei)+γ(ei))]
The click model can be schematically represented as a flow graph in Fig-
ure 6.1. Labels on the edges refer to the probability of the user traversing
them. Each vertex in the figure corresponds to a view epoch (see below),
and the flow balance holds at each vertex. Starting from the top entity, the
probability of the user clicking the first ad is R(e1) and probability of him
abandoning browsing is γ(e1). The user goes beyond the first entity with
probability 1− (R(e1) + γ(e1)) and so on for the subsequent results.
In this model, we assume that the parameters—C(ei), γ(ei) and U(ei)—
are functions of the entity at the current position i.e. these parameters are
independent of other entities the user has already seen. We recognize that this
assumption is not fully accurate, since the users decision to click the current
78
item or leave search may depend not just on the current item but rather all the
items he has seen before in the list. We stick to the assumption for the optimal
ranking analysis below, since considering mutual influence of ads can lead to
combinatorial optimization problems with intractable solutions. We will show
that even the simplest dependence between the parameters will indeed lead to
intractable optimal ranking in Section 6.5.
Though the proposed model is intuitive enough, we would like to mention
that the model is also confirmed by the recent empirical click models. For
example, the General Click Model (GCM) by Zhu et al. [18] is based on the
same basic user behavior. The GCM is empirically validated for both search
results and ads [18]. Further, other click models are shown to be special cases
of GCM (hence special cases of the model used in this dissertation). Please
refer to Zhu et al. [18] for a detailed discussion. These previous works avoids
the need for separate model validation, as well as confirm feasibility of the
parameter estimation.
6.2 Optimal Ranking
Based on the click model, we formally define the ranking problem and derive
optimal ranking in this section. The problem may be state as,
Choose the optimal ranking Eopt = 〈e1, e2, .., eN〉 of N entities to maximize
the expected utility
E(U) =
N∑
i=1
U(ei)Pc(ei) (6.1)
where N is the total number of entities to be ranked.
For the browsing model in Figure 6.1, the click probability for the entity
at the ith position is,
Pc(ei) = C(ei)
i−1∏
j=1
[1− (C(ej) + γ(ej))] (6.2)
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Substituting click probability Pc from Equation 6.2 in Equation 6.1 we get,
E(U) =
N∑
i=1
U(ei)C(ei)
i−1∏
j=1
[1− (C(ej) + γ(ej))] (6.3)
The optimal ranking maximizing this expected utility can be shown to be
a sorting problem with a simple ranking function:
Theorem 1. The expected utility in Equation 6.3 is maximum if the entities
are placed in the descending order of the value of the ranking function CE,
CE(ei) =
U(ei)C(ei)
C(ei) + γ(ei)
(6.4)
Proof Sketch: The proof shows that any inversion in this order will reduce
the expected profit. CE function is deduced from expected profits of two
placements—the CE ranked placement and placement in which the order of
two adjacent ads are inverted. We show that the expected profit from the
inverted placement can be no greater that the CE ranked placement. Please
refer to Appendix A-1 for the complete proof. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the ranking function CE is the utility
generated per unit view probability consumed by the entity. With respect to
browsing model in Figure 6.1, the top entities in the ranked list have higher
view probabilities, and placing ads with greater utility per consumed view
probability higher intuitively increases total utilities.
Note that the ordering above does not maximize the utility for select-
ing a subset of items. The seemingly intuitive method of ranking the set of
items by CE and selecting top-k may not be optimal [51]. For optimal selec-
tion, the proposed ranking can be extended by a dynamic programming based
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Figure 6.2: Taxonomy of reduced ranking functions of CE . The assumptions
and corresponding reduced ranking functions are illustrated. The dotted lines
denote predicted ranking functions incorporating new click model parameters.
selection—similar to the method suggested by Aggrawal et al [51] for max-
imizing advertiser’s profit. In this dissertation, we discuss only the ranking
problem.
6.3 Ranking Taxonomy
As we mentioned before, the CE ranking will can be made applicable to differ-
ent ranking problems by plugging in the corresponding utilities. For example,
if we plug in relevance as utility (U(e) in Equation 6.4), the ranking function
is for the documents, whereas if we plug in cost per click of ads, the ranking
function is for ads. Further, we may assume specific constraints on one or
more of the three parameters of CE ranking (e.g. ∀iγ(ei) = 0). Through these
assumptions, CE ranking will suggest a number of reduced ranking functions
with specific applications. These substitutions and reductions can be enumer-
ated as a taxonomy of ranking functions.
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We show the taxonomy in Figure 6.2. The three top branches of the taxon-
omy (U(e) = R(d), U(e) = $(a), and U(e) = v(a) branches) are for document
ranking, ad ranking maximizing search engine profit, and ad ranking max-
imizing advertisers revenue respectively. These branches correspond to the
substitution of utilities by document relevance, CPC, and private value of the
advertisers. The sub-trees below these branches are the further reduced cases
of these three main categories. The solid lines in Figure 6.2 denote the al-
ready known functions, while the dotted lines are the new ranking functions
suggested by CE ranking. Sections 6.3.1,6.3.2, and 6.3.3 below discuss the fur-
ther reductions of document ranking, search engine optimal ad ranking, and
social optimal ad ranking respectively.
6.3.1 Document Ranking
For the document ranking the utility of ranking is the probability of relevance
of the document. Hence by substituting the document relevance—denoted by
R(d)—in Equation 6.4 we get
CE(d) =
C(d)R(d)
C(d) + γ(d)
(6.5)
This function suggests the general optimal relevance ranking for the docu-
ments. We discuss some intuitively valid assumptions on user model for the
document ranking and the corresponding ranking functions below. The three
assumptions discussed below correspond to the three branches under Docu-
ment Ranking subtree in Figure 6.2.
6.3.1.1 Sort by Relevance (PRP)
We elucidate two sets of assumptions under which the CE(d) in Equation 6.5
will reduce to PRP.
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First assume that the user has infinite patience, and never abandons results
(i.e. γ(d) ≈ 0). Substituting this assumption in Equation 6.5,
CE(d) ≈ R(d)C(d)
C(d)
= R(d) (6.6)
which is exactly the ranking suggested by PRP.
In other words PRP is optimal for scenarios in which the user has infinite
patience and never abandons checking the results (i.e. the user leaves browsing
the results only by clicking a result).
The second set of slightly weaker assumptions under which the CE(d) will
reduce to PRP are:
1. C(d) ≈ R(d).
2. Abandonment probability γ(d) is negatively proportional to the docu-
ment relevance i.e. γ(d) ≈ k −R(d), where k is a constant between one
and zero. This assumption corresponds to the intuition that the higher
the perceived relevance of the current result, the less likely is the user
abandoning the search.
Now CE(d) reduces to,
CE(d) ≈ R(d)
2
k
(6.7)
Since this function is strictly increasing withR(d), ordering just byR(d) results
in the same ranking as suggested by the function. This implies that PRP is
optimal under these assumptions also.
We should note that abandonment probability decreasing with perceived
relevance is a more intuitively valid assumption than the infinite patience
assumption above.
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6.3.1.2 Ranking Considering Perceived Relevance
Recent click log studies have been used to effectively assess perceived relevance
of document search snippets [19, 20]. Is it still an open question as ever as to
how to use the perceived relevance for improved document ranking is unknown.
We show that depending on the nature of abandonment probability γ(d), the
optimal ranking considering perceived relevance differs.
If we assume that γ(d) ≈ 0 in Equation 6.5, the optimal perceived relevance
ranking is the same as that suggested by PRP as we have seen in Equation 6.6.
On the other hand, if we assume that the abandonment probability is
negatively proportional to the perceived relevance (γ(d) = k−C(d)) as above,
the optimal ranking considering perceived relevance is
CE(d) ≈ C(d)R(d)
k
∝ C(d)R(d) (6.8)
i.e. sorting in the order of the product of document relevance and perceived
relevance is optimal under these assumptions. The assumption of abandon-
ment probabilities negatively proportional to relevance is more realistic than
infinite patience assumption as we discussed above. This discussion shows
that by estimating nature of abandonment probability, one would be able to
decide on the optimal perceived relevance ranking.
6.3.1.3 Ranking Considering Abandonment
We now consider the ranking considering abandonment probability γ(d), with
the assumption that the perceived relevance is approximately equal to the
actual relevance. In this case CE(d) becomes,
CE(d) ≈ R(d)
2
R(d) + γ(d)
(6.9)
Clearly this is not a strictly increasing function with R(d). So the ranking
considering abandonment is different from PRP ranking, even if we assume
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that the perceived relevance is equal to the actual relevance. The abandonment
ranking becomes same as PRP on the assumption that ∀dγ(d) = 0, .
6.3.2 Optimal Ad Ranking for Search Engines
For the paid placement of ads, the utility of ads to the search engine are Cost
Per Click (CPC) of ads. Hence, by substituting the CPC of the ad—denoted
by $(a) —in Equation 6.4 we get
CE(a) =
C(a)$(a)
C(a) + γ(a)
(6.10)
Thus this function suggests the general optimal ranking for the ads. Please
recall that the perceived relevance C(a) is the same as the Click Through Rate
(CTR) used for ad placement [16].
In the following subsections we demonstrate how the general ranking pre-
sented reduces to the currently used ad placement strategies under appropriate
assumptions. We will show that they all correspond to the specific assumptions
on the abandonment probability γ(a). These two functions below correspond
to the two branches under the SE Optimal ad placement subtree in Figure 6.2.
6.3.2.1 Ranking by Bid Amount
The sort by bid amount ranking was used by Overture Services (and was later
used by Yahoo! for a while after their acquisition of Overture). Assuming that
the user never abandons browsing (i.e. ∀aγ(a) = 0), Equation 6.10 reduces to
CE(a) = $(a) (6.11)
This means that the ads are ranked purely in terms of their payment. To be
precise, Overture ranks by bid amount, which is different from payment in a
second price auction (since payment will be next higher bid amount). But
both will result in the same ranking.
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When γ(a) = 0, we essentially have a user with infinite patience who will
keep browsing downwards until he finds the relevant ad. So, to maximize
profit, it makes perfect sense to rank ads by bid amount. More generally, for
small abandonment probabilities, ranking by bid amount is near optimal. Note
that this ranking is isomorphic to PRP ranking discussed above for document
ranking, since both rank based only on utilities.
6.3.2.2 Ranking by Expected Profit
Google and Microsoft are purported to be placing the ads in the order of
expected profit based on product of CTR (C(a) in CE) and bid amount
($(a)) [52]. The ranking is part of the well known Generalized Second Price
(GSP) auction mechanism. If we approximate abandonment probability as
negatively proportional to the CTR of the ad (i.e. ∀aγ(a) = k − C(a)) , the
Equation 6.10 reduces to,
CE(a) ≈ $(a)R(a)
k
∝ $(a)R(a) (6.12)
This shows that ranking ads by their standalone expected profit is near op-
timal as long as the abandonment probability is negatively proportional to
the relevance. To be accurate, Google mechanism—GSP—uses bid amount of
the advertisers (instead of CPC in Equation 6.12) for ranking. We will show
that both will result in the same ranking by an order preserving property of
the GSP pricing in Section 6.4. Note that this ranking is isomorphic to the
perceived relevance ranking of the documents discussed above.
6.3.3 Revenue Optimal Ad Ranking
An important property of the auction mechanism is the expected revenue—
which is the sum of the profits of the advertisers and the search engine. To
analyze advertisers’ profit, a private value model is commonly used. Each
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advertiser is assigned with a private value for the click equal to the expected
revenue from the click. Advertisers pay a fraction of this revenue to the search
engine depending on the pricing mechanism. The profit for advertisers is the
difference between the private value and payment to the search engine. Profit
for the search engine is the payment from the advertisers. Consequently, the
revenue is the sum of the profits of all the parties—search engine and the
advertisers.
The Advertiser Social Optima branch in Figure 6.2 corresponds to the
ranking to maximize total revenue. Private value of advertisers ai is denoted
as—v(ai). By substituting the utility by private values in Equation 6.4 we get,
CE(d) =
C(a)v(a)
C(a) + γ(a)
(6.13)
If the ads are ranked in this order, the ranking will guarantee maximum rev-
enue.
In Figure 6.2 the two left branches of revenue maximizing subtree (labeled
γ(a) = 0 and γ(a) = k−C(a)) correspond respectively to the assumption of no
abandonment, and abandonment probabilities being negatively proportional
to the click probability. These two cases are isomorphic to the Overture and
Google ranking discussed in Section 6.3.2 above. We discuss further on revenue
maximizing ranking in conjunction with a pricing mechanism in Section 6.4
The revenue optimal ranking is not directly implementable as search en-
gines do not know the private value of the advertisers. But this ranking is
useful in analysis of auctions mechanisms. Further, the search engine may
try to effectuate this order through auction mechanism equilibriums as we
demonstrate in Section 6.4.
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6.4 Extending to Auctions
We have shown that CE ranking maximizes the profits for search engines for
given CPCs in Section 6.3.2. In ad placement, the net profit of ranking to the
search engine can only be analyzed in association with a pricing mechanism.
To this end, we introduce a pricing to be used with the CE thus designing
a full auction mechanism. Subsequently, we analyze the properties of the
mechanism.
Let us start by describing the dynamics of ad auctions describe in Chapter 2
briefly. The search engine decides the ranking and pricing of the ads based
on the bid amounts of the advertisers. Generally the pricing is not equal to
the bid amount of the advertiser, but is instead derived based on the bids [32,
31, 53]. In response to these ranking and pricing strategies, the advertisers
(more commonly, the software agents of the advertisers) may change their
bids to maximize their profits. They may change bids hundreds of times a
day. Eventually, the bids will stabilize at a fixed point where no advertiser can
increase his profit by unilaterally changing his bid. This set of bids corresponds
to a Nash Equilibrium of the auction mechanism. Hence the expected profits
of a search engine will be the profits corresponding to the Nash Equilibrium.
The next section discusses the properties of any mechanism based on the
user model in Figure 6.1—independent of the ranking and pricing strategies.
In Section 6.4.2, we introduce a pricing mechanism and analyze its properties
including the equilibrium.
6.4.1 Pricing Independent Properties
In this section we illustrate properties arising based on the user browsing model
in Figure 6.1, not assuming any pricing or ranking strategy. One of the basic
results is
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Remark 1. In any equilibrium the payment by the advertisers is less than
or equal to their private values (i.e. individual rationality of the bidders is
maintained).
If this is not true, this advertiser may opt out from the auction by bidding
zero and increase the profit, thereby violating the assumption of an equilib-
rium.
Remark 2. In any equilibrium, the price paid by an advertiser increases
monotonically as he moves up in the ranking unilaterally.
From the browsing model, click probability of the advertisers is non-decreasing
as he moves up in the position. Unless the price increases monotonically, ad-
vertiser can increase his profit by moving up, violating the assumption of an
equilibrium.
Note that the proposed model is a general case of the positional auctions
model by Varian [54]. Positional auctions assume static click probabilities
for each position independent of the other ads. We assume realistic dynamic
click probabilities depending on the ads above. Due to these externalities, the
model is more complex and does not hold many of the properties derived by
Varian [54] (e.g. monotonically increasing values and prices with positions).
Remark 3. Irrespective of the ranking and pricing, the sum of revenues of
the advertisers is upper bounded at
E(V ) =
N∑
i=1
v(ai)C(ai)
i−1∏
j=1
[1− (C(aj) + γ(aj))] (6.14)
when the advertisers are ordered by C(a)v(a)
C(a)+γ(a)
. Further, this is an upper bound
for the search engine profit.
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This result directly follows from the Advertisers Social Optima branch in
Figure 6.2, and Equation 6.13.
The revenue is shared among the advertisers and search engine. For each
click, dvertisers get a revenue equal to the private value v(a) and pay a fraction
equal to the CPC (set by the search engine pricing strategy) to the search
engine. The total payoff for the search engine is the sum of the payments
by the advertisers. Conversely, total payoff to the advertisers is the difference
between the total revenue and payoff to the search engine. Since the suggested
order above in Remark 3 maximizes revenue, which is the sum of the payoffs
of all the players (search engine and the advertisers), this is a socially optimal
order and the revenue realized is the socially optimal revenue.
A corollary of the social optimality combined with the individual rationality
result in Remark 1 is that,
Remark 4. The quantity E(V ) in Remark 3 is an upper bound for the search
engine profit irrespective of the ranking and pricing mechanism.
Social optimal revenue can be realized only if the ads are in the descending
order of C(a)v(a)
C(a)+γ(a)
. Social optimum is desirable for search engines, since this
will increase the payoffs for advertisers for the same CPC. Increased payoffs
will increase the advertiser’s incentive to advertise with the search engine and
will increase business for the search engine in the long term.
Since search engines do not know the private value of the advertisers (note
that search engine perform the ranking), social optimal ranking based on pri-
vate values is not directly feasible. We need to design a mechanism having an
equilibrium coinciding with the social optimality. This will motivate advertis-
ers towards bids coinciding with social optimal ordering. In addition to social
optimality, it is highly desirable for the mechanism to be based on CE rank-
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ing to simultaneously maximize advertiser’s revenue and search engine profit.
In the following section we propose such a mechanism using CE ranking and
prove the existence of an equilibrium in which the CE ranking coincides with
the socially optimal allocation.
6.4.2 Pricing and Equilibrium
In this section, we define a pricing strategy to use with the CE ranking, and
analyze the properties of the resulting mechanism.
For defining the pricing strategy, we define the pricing order as the de-
creasing order of w(a)b(a), where w(a) is,
w(a) =
C(a)
C(a) + γ(a)
(6.15)
In this pricing order, we denote the ith advertiser’s w(ai) as wi, C(ai) as ci,
b(ai) as bi, and the abandonment probability γ(ai) as γi for convenience. Let
µi = ci+γi. For each click, advertiser ai is charged with a price pi (CPC) equal
to the minimum bid required to maintain its position in the pricing order,
pi =
wi+1bi+1
wi
=
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
(6.16)
Substituting pi in Equation 6.10 for the ranking order, CE of the i
th ad-
vertiser is,
CEi =
pici
µi
(6.17)
This proposed mechanism preserves the pricing order in the ranking order
as well, i.e.
Theorem 2. The order by wibi is the same as the order by CEi for the auction
i.e.
wibi ≥ wjbj ⇐⇒ CEi ≥ CEj (6.18)
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Proof is given in the Appendix A-2. This order preservation property
implies that the final ranking is the same as that based on bid amounts. i.e.
ads can be ranked based on the bid mounts instead of CPCs. After the ranking,
the CPCs can be decided based on this ranking order. A corollary of this order
preservation is that the CPC is equal to the minimum amount the advertisers
have to pay to maintain his position in the ranking order.
Further we show below that any advertisers’ CPC is less than or equal to
his bid.
Lemma 1 (Individual Rationality). The payment pi of any advertiser is less
or equal to his bid amount.
Proof.
pi =
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
=
bi+1ci+1
µi+1
µi
cibi
bi ≤ bi(since CEi ≥ CEi+1)
This means advertisers will never have to pay more than his bid, similar
to GSP. This property makes it easy for the advertiser to decide his bid, as
he may bid up to his click valuation. He will never have to pay more than his
revenue irrespective of bids of other advertisers.
Interestingly, this mechanism also is a general case of the existing mech-
anisms, as in the case of CE ranking. In particular, the mechanism reduces
to GSP (Google mechanism) and Overture mechanisms on the same assump-
tions on which CE ranking reduces to respective rankings (described in Sec-
tion 6.3.2).
Lemma 2. The mechanism reduces to Overture ranking with second price
auction on the assumption ∀iγi = 0
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Proof. This assumption implies
wi = 1
⇒ pi = bi+1 (second price auction)
⇒ CEi = bi+1 ≡ bi (i.e. ranking by bi+1 is equivalent to ranking by bi)
Lemma 3. The mechanism reduces to GSP on assumption ∀iγi = k − ci
Proof. This assumption implies
wi = ci
⇒ pi = bi+1ci+1
ci
(GSP pricing)
⇒ CEi = bi+1ci+1
k
≡ bici
k
(by Theorem 2)
∝ bici
This in conjunction with Theorem 2 implies that GSP ranking by cibi (i.e.
by bids) is the same as the ranking by cipi (by CPCs).
Now we will look at the equilibrium properties of the mechanism. We start
by noticing that truth telling is not a dominant strategy. This trivially follows
from the proof that GSP is a special case of the proposed mechanism. It is
well known that for GSP truth telling is not a dominant strategy [31]. Hence
we center our analysis on Nash Equilibrium conditions.
Theorem 3 (Nash Equilibrium). Without loss of generality assume that the
advertisers are ordered in the decreasing order of civi
µi
where vi is the private
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value of the ith advertiser. The advertisers are in a pure strategy Nash Equi-
librium if
bi =
µi
ci
[
vici + (1− µi)bi+1ci+1
µi+1
]
(6.19)
This equilibrium is socially optimal as well as optimal for search engines for
the given CPC’s.
Proof Sketch: The inductive proof shows that for these bid values, no
advertiser can increase his profit by moving up or down in the ranking. The
full proof is given in Appendix A-3. 
We do not rule out the existence of multiple equilibria. The stated equi-
librium is particularly interesting, due to the simultaneous social optimality
and search engine optimality.
The following remarks show that the equilibria of other placement mech-
anisms are reduced cases of the proposed CE equilibrium, as a natural con-
sequence of its generality. The stated equilibrium reduces to equilibriums in
Overture mechanism and GSP under the same assumptions under which the
ranking reduces to respective rankings.
Remark 5. The bid values
bi = vici + (1− ci)bi+1 (6.20)
are a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in Overture mechanism. This corresponds
to the substitution of the assumption ∀iγi = 0 (i.e. µi = ci) in Theorem 3.
The proof follows from Theorem 3 as both pricing and ranking is shown to
be a special case of our proposed mechanism.
Similarly for GSP,
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Remark 6. The bid values
bi = vik + (1− k)bi+1ci+1 (6.21)
are a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in GSP mechanism.
This equilibrium corresponds to the substitution of the assumption ∀iγi =
k − ci (1 ≥ k ≥ 0) in Theorem 3. Since this is a special case, the proof for
Theorem 3 is sufficient.
6.4.3 Comparison with VCG mechanism
We compare the revenue and equilibrium of CE mechanism with those of
VCG [21, 22, 23]. VCG auctions combine an optimal allocation (ranking)
with VCG pricing. VCG payment of a bidder is equal to the reduction of
revenues of other bidders due to the presence of the bidder. A well known
property is that VCG pricing with any socially optimal allocation has truth
telling as the dominant strategy equilibrium.
In the context of online ads, a ranking optimal with respect to the bid
amounts is socially optimal ranking for VCG. This optimal ranking is bici
µi
; as
directly implied by the Equation 1 on substituting bi for utilities. Hence this
ranking combined with VCG pricing has truth telling as the dominant strategy
equilibrium. Since bi = vi at the dominant strategy equilibrium, ranking is
socially optimal for an advertiser’s true value as suggested in Equation 6.13.
The CE ranking function is different from VCG since CE ranking by pay-
ments optimizes search engine profits. On the other hand, VCG ranks by
bids optimizing the advertiser’s profit. But Theorem 2 shows that for the
pricing used in CE, ordering of CE is the same as that of VCG. This order-
preserving property facilitates the comparison of CE with VCG. The theorem
below shows revenue dominance of CE over VCG for the same bid values of
advertisers.
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Theorem 4 (Search Engine Revenue Dominance). For the same bid values
for all the advertisers, the revenue of the search engine by CE mechanism is
greater or equal to the revenue by VCG.
Proof Sketch: The proof is an induction based on the fact that the ranking
by CE and VCG are the same, as mentioned above. Full proof is given in
Appendix A-4. 
This theorem shows that the CE mechanism is likely to provide higher rev-
enue to the search engine even during transient times before the bids stabilize
on equilibriums.
Based on Theorem 4 we prove revenue equivalence of the proposed CE
equilibrium with dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG.
Theorem 5 (Equilibrium Revenue Equivalence). At the equilibrium in The-
orem 3, the revenue of search engine is equal to the revenue of the truthful
dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG.
Proof Sketch: The proof is an inductive extension of the Theorem 4. Please
refer to Appendix A-5 for complete proof. 
Note that the CE equilibrium has lower bid values than VCG at the equi-
librium, but provides the same profit to the search engine.
6.5 Considering Mutual Influences: Diversity Ranking
An assumption in CE ranking is that the entities are mutually independent
as we pointed out in Section 6.1. In other words, the three parameters—U(e),
C(e) and γ(e)—of an entity do not depend on other entities in the ranked
list. In this section we relax this assumption and analyze the implications.
Since the nature of the mutual influence may vary for different problems,
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we base our analysis on a specific well known problem—ranking considering
diversity [24, 25, 26].
Diversity ranking accounts for the fact that the utility of an entity is re-
duced by the presence of a similar entity above in the ranked list. This is a
typical example of the mutual influence between the entities. All the existing
objective functions for the diversity ranking are known to be NP-Hard [24].
We analyze a most basic form of diversity ranking to explain why this is a
fundamentally hard problem.
We modify the objective function in Equation 6.1 slightly to distinguish
between the standalone utilities and the residual utilities—utility of an entity
in the context of other entities in the list—as,
E(U) =
N∑
i=1
Ur(ei)Pc(ei) (6.22)
where Ur(ei) denotes the residual utility.
We consider a simple case of diversity ranking problem by considering a set
of entities—all having the same utilities, perceived relevances and abandon-
ment probabilities. Some of these entities may be repeating. If an entity in the
ranked list is the same as the entity in the list above, residual utility of that
entity becomes zero. In this case, it is intuitive that the optimal ranking is
to place the maximum number of pair-wise dissimilar entities in the top slots.
The theorem below shows that even in this simple case the optimal ranking is
NP-Hard.
Theorem 6. Diversity ranking optimizing expected utility in Equation 6.22 is
NP-Hard.
Proof Sketch: The proof is by reduction from the independent set problem.
See Appendix A-6 for the complete proof. 
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Moreover, the proof by reduction from independent set problem has more
severe implications than NP-Hardness as shown in the following corollary,
Corollary 1. The constant approximation algorithm for ranking considering
diversity is hard.
Proof: The proof of NP-Hardness theorem above shows that the inde-
pendent set problem is a special case of diversity ranking. This implies that
a constant ratio approximation algorithm for the optimal diversity ranking
would be a constant ratio approximation algorithm for the independent set
problem. Since constant ratio approximation of the independent set is known
to be hard (cf. Garey and Johnson [55] and H˚astad [56]) the corollary follows.
To define hard, in his landmark paper H˚astad proved that independent set
cannot be solved within n1− for  > 0 unless all problems in NP are solvable
in probabilistic polynomial time, which is widely believed to be not possible.1

This section shows that the optimal ranking considering mutual influences
of parameters is hard. We leave formulating approximation algorithms (not
necessarily constant ratio) for future research.
Beyond proving the intractability of mutual influence ranking, we believe
that intractability of the simple scenario here explains why all diversity rank-
ings are likely to be intractable. Further, the proof based on the reduction
from the well explored independent set problem may help in adapting approx-
imations algorithms from graph theory.
6.6 Simulation Experiments
The analysis in the previous sections shows that the existing ranking strategies
are optimal only under more restrictive assumptions on parameters. This
1This belief is almost as strong as the belief P 6= NP
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suggests that the expected relevances for documents (and profits for ads) can
be improved by ranking using CE ranking. We perform a number of simulation
experiments to quantify the potential increases in expected utilities by CE and
its reduced forms.
In our first experiment in Figure 6.3a, we compare the CE ranking with
rank by bid amount (Equation 6.11) strategy by Overture and rank by bid
× perceived relevance (Equation 6.12) by Google. We assigned the perceived
relevance values as a uniform random number between 0 and α (0 ≤ α ≤ 1)
and abandonment probabilities as random between 0 and 1 − α (this assures
that ∀i (C(ai) + γ(ai)) ≤ 1). The bid amounts for ads are assigned uniformly
random between 0 and 1. Note that uniform random is the maximum entropy
distribution and makes least assumptions about the bid amounts. The number
of relevant ads (corresponding to the number of bids on a query) is set to fifty.
Simulated users are made to click on ads. The number of ads clicked is set as
a random number generated in a zipf distribution with exponent 1.5. A power
law is most intuitive for the distribution of the number of clicks.
Simulated users browse down the list. Users click an entity with probability
equal to the perceived relevance and abandon search with a probability equal
to the abandonment probability. The set of entities to be placed is created
at random for each run. For the same set of entities, three runs—one with
each ranking strategy—are performed. Simulation is repeated 2 × 105 times
for each value of alpha.
In Figure 6.3a CE ranking is optimal for all values of α as expected. Con-
firming with the discussions in Subsection 6.3.2 above, as the abandonment
probability becomes smaller ranking by bid strategy gives better profits and
reaches optimal at γ(a) = 0 (i.e α = 0). The expected profit by CE exceeds
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that by the competing strategy by 40-80% for some values of α. For example,
at α = 0.3 bid × percieved (competing strategy) gives an expected profit of
$0.34 while CE gives a profit of $0.63 (exceeds by 84.4%) and for α = 0.5
bid × perceived gives a profit of $0.69, as against $0.97 by CE (exceeds by
40.6%). Further, perceived relevance ranking dominates rank by bid strategy
for most values of α.
Another way of interpreting Figure 6.3a is as the comparison of ranking by
CE, PRP and perceived relevance ranking (Equation 6.8). As we discussed,
PRP and perceived relevance rankings exactly corresponds to ad rankings by
bid and bid × perceived relevance respectively, with utility being relevance
instead of bid amounts. The simulation graphs will look exactly the same.
In Figure 6.3b we compare CE, PRP and abandonment ranking (Equa-
tion 6.9) under the same settings used for Figure 6.3a. CE provides the
maximum utility as expected, and abandonment ranking comes in second
place. Abandonment ranking provides sub-optimal utility—since the condition
∀dR(d) = C(d) is not satisfied—but dominates over PRP. Also as abandon-
ment probability becomes zero (i.e α = 1) abandonment rankings becomes
same as PRP and optimal as we discussed in Subsection 6.3.1.
Figure 6.4a compares the perceived relevance ranking (Equation 6.8), CE,
and PRP under the condition for optimality for perceived relevance ranking
(∀dγ(d) = k − R(d)). For this, we set γ(d) = α − C(d) keeping all other
settings same as the previous experiments. The Figure 6.4a shows that the
perceived relevance ranking provides optimal utility, exactly overlapping with
CE curve as expected. Further, note that utilities by PRP are very low under
this condition. The utilities by PRP in fact goes down after α = 0.2. The
increase in abandonment probability, as well as increased sub-optimality of
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PRP for higher abandonment (since PRP does not consider abandonment)
probabilities may be causing this reduction.
In our next experiment shown in Figure 6.4b, we compare abandonment
ranking (Equation 6.9) with PRP and CE under the condition ∀dC(d) = R(d)
(i.e. optimality condition for abandonment ranking). All other settings are
the same as those for the experiments in Figure 6.3a and 6.3b. Here we
observe that the abandonment ranking is optimal and exactly overlaps with
CE as expected. PRP is sub-optimal but closer to optimal than random C(d)
used for experiments in Figure 6.3b. The reason may be that C(d) = R(d)
is one of the two conditions required for PRP to be optimal for both sets of
assumptions we discussed in Subsection 6.3.1. When abandonment probability
becomes zero PRP relevance reaches optimum as we have already seen.
Simulation experiments exactly confirm to the predictions by the theoret-
ical analysis above. Although the simulation is no substitute for experiments
on real data, we expect that observed significant improvements in expected
utilities would motivate future research to evaluate these rankings on click
logs.
6.7 Chapter Summery
We approach the web ranking as a utility maximization based on user’s click
model, and derive the optimal ranking—namely CE ranking. The ranking is
simple and intuitive; and optimal considering perceived relevance and aban-
donment probability of user behavior. For specific assumptions on parameters
the ranking function reduces to a taxonomy of ranking functions in multi-
ple ranking domains. The enumerated taxonomy will help to decide optimal
ranking for a specific user behavior. In addition, the taxonomy shows that the
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existing document and ad ranking strategies are special cases of the proposed
ranking function under specific assumptions.
To apply CE ranking to ad auctions, we incorporate a second price based
pricing. The resulting CE mechanism has a Nash Equilibrium in pure strate-
gies which simultaneously optimizes search engine and advertiser revenues.
CE mechanism is revenue dominant over VCG for the same bid vectors, and
has an equilibrium which is revenue equivalent with the truthful equilibrium
of VCG. Finally, we relax the assumption of independence between entities in
CE ranking and consider diversity ranking. The ensuing analysis revels that
diversity ranking is an inherently hard problem; since even the basic formula-
tions are NP-Hard with unlikely constant ratio approximation algorithms. Our
simulation analysis suggests significant improvement in profits by CE ranking
over existing ranking strategies.
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Figure 6.3: (a) Comparison of Overture, Google and CE rankings. Perceived
relevances are uniformly random in [0, α] and abandonment probabilities are
uniformly random in [0, 1 − α]. CE provides optimal expected profits for all
values of α. (b) Comparison of CE, PRP and abandonment ranking (Equa-
tion 6.9). Abandonment ranking dominates PRP.
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Figure 6.4: Optimality of reduced forms under specific assumptions (a) fixing
γ(d) = k − R(d). Perceived relevance ranking is optimal for all values of α.
(b) fixing C(d) = R(d). Abandonment ranking is optimal.
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Chapter 7
Related Work
There has been a large volume of research in ranking of organic and sponsored
results. Even before the prevalence of the World Wide Web, there is early
research in library information retrieval and traditional auctions. Among the
volume or related research, we describe selected closely related research in
deep web and online ad ranking in sections below.
7.1 Deep web Ranking
The related research in deep web may be segregated into three areas:
1. Source selection in deep web integration and in other data integration
problems.
2. Trust analysis for open collections including the surface and the deep
web.
3. Related problems in searching including result ranking, sampling, schema
mapping etc.
We discuss the past research in these three categories in three sections below.
7.1.1 Source Selection
The indispensability and difficulty of source selection for the deep web has
been recognized previously [57]. Current relational database selection meth-
ods minimize the cost by retrieving maximum number of distinct records from
minimum number of sources [4]. Cost based web database selection is formu-
lated as selecting the least number of databases maximizing number of relevant
tuples (coverage). The related problem of collecting source statistics [4, 8] has
also been researched. These papers do not address the ranking problem but
related problems in deep web integration.
Considering research in the text databases selection, Callan et al. [6] for-
mulated a method called CORI for query specific selection based on relevance.
Cooperative and non-cooperative text database sampling [37, 8] and selection
considering coverage and overlap to minimize the cost [45, 7] are addressed by
a number of researchers. As we mentioned in the introduction, none of these
relational or text databases selection methods consider trust and importance
of the databases, which is the main focus of or research.
Centralized warehousing approaches have been tried for integrating parts
of the deep web. Google Product Search [28] works on Google Base—an open
repository for products—contains data from large number of web databases.
In a different surfacing approach of extending the search to web databases,
Google crawls and index parts of the data in popular sources as html pages,
disregarding the structure [27]. Neither of these papers focuses on ranking
problem.
7.1.2 Trust Analysis
A probabilistic framework for trust assessment based on agreement of web
pages for question answering has been presented by Yin et al. [58], and Yin
and Tan [59]. Galland et. al. [60] did an experimental comparison of several
fixed point methods to compute trustworthiness of binary facts (true or false).
These frameworks however do not consider the influence of relevance on agree-
ment, multiple correct answers to a query, record linkage and non-cooperative
sources; thus have limiting its usability in the deep web.
Dong et al. [61, 42] extend this basic idea of Yin et al. [58], and extend the
work by computing source dependence and using a different accuracy model.
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In this work source copying is detected based on completeness, accuracy and
formatting [42]. But deep web collusion is more than having same data (hence
data copying), since collusion manifests in data and ranking as discussed in
Section 3.6. Further, limited access based on keyword search makes it hard to
retrieve the entire data, making extensions of methods by Dong et al. to deep
web collusion detection hard. As we shall see, the collusion detection in the
deep web needs to address different constraints including multiple true val-
ues, non-cooperative sources, and ranked answer sets. Our collusion detection
approach accounts for these additional difficulties.
Clustered analyzing of trust for multi-group environments has been at-
tempted by Gupta et al. [62]. Gupta and Han [63] give a comprehensive
survey of network based trust analysis which includes detailed discussions of
SourceRank [64, 65].
7.1.3 Search and Result Ranking
The problem of ranking database tuples for keyword search in databases has
been addressed [9, 66]. The focus of these papers are on relevance assessment
of tuples for keyword search in a single database, and problems of trust and
importance are not considered. Improving web database search relevance by
exploiting the search results from a surface web search engine was attempted
by Agrawal et al. [67]. Their paper considers the relevance assessment for
search in a single database, and does not consider the trust problem. Further,
the paper assumes availability of high-quality web search results on the same
topics as a reference.
Combining multiple retrieval methods for text documents has been used
for improved accuracy [68]. Lee [69] observes that the different methods are
likely to agree on the same relevant documents than on irrelevant documents.
107
This observation rhymes with our argument in Section 3.1 in giving a basis for
agreement-based relevance assessment. For the surface web, Gyo¨ngyi et al. [70]
proposed trust rank, an extension of page rank considering trustworthiness of
hyperlinked pages. Kurland and Lee [71] proposed a re-ranking approach
based on centrality on a graph induced by language models. Agreement on
hidden variables between several learners has been used to achieve tractable
learning time for joint learning [72].
Many of the related problems in deep web integration and search have
been addressed. Number of methods are used for schema mapping of form
interfaces of different web databases [73, 74, 75]. The sampling problem of
web databases was explored [76, 77]. Number of methods has been tried
for record linkage [36, 78]. Completion and expansion of autonomous web
database records at query time was attempted by a few papers [79, 80].
7.2 Ad Ranking
The related research falls into the categories of:
1. The user click models.
2. Document ranking based on a utility maximization approach, and diver-
sity ranking.
3. Recent work on optimizing ad auctions based on click models.
We discuss the research in these three areas in the sections below.
7.2.1 Click Models
User behavior studies in click models validate the ranking function introduced.
There are a number of position based and cascade models studied recently [81,
30, 17, 82, 18]. In particular, General Click Model (GCM) by Zhu et al.[18]
is closely related to the model we used as we mentioned above. Zhu et al. [18]
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have listed assumptions under which the GCM would reduce to other click
models. Optimizing utilities of two dimensional placement of search results
has been studied by Chierichetti et al. [83]. These models empirically validate
the correctness of the click model used in this dissertation.
Along with the current click models, there has been research on evaluat-
ing perceived relevance of the search snippets [19] and ad impressions [20].
Research in this direction neatly complements our new ranking function by
estimating the parameters required.
7.2.2 Ranking
The existing document ranking based on PRP [14] claims that a retrieval
order sorted on relevance leads to the largest number of relevant documents
in a result set than any other policy. Gordon and Lenk [15, 84] identified
the required assumptions for the optimality of the ranking according to PRP.
Our discussion on PRP may be considered as an independent formulation of
assumptions under which PRP is optimal for web ranking.
Diversity ranking has received considerable attention recently [25, 26]. The
objective functions used to measure diversity by prior works are known to be
NP-Hard [24].
7.2.3 Ad Auctions
The impact of click models on ranking has been analyzed in ad-placement.
In our workshop paper [85] we proposed the optimal ad ranking considering
mutual influences. The ranking uses the same user model, but the paper
considers only ad ranking, and does not include generalizations and auctions.
Later Aggarwal et al. [51] as well as Kempe and Mahdian [86] analyzed place-
ment of ads using a similar Markovian click model. The click model used is
less detailed than our model since abandonment is not modeled separately
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from click probability. These two papers optimize the sum of the revenues of
the advertisers. We optimize search engine profits. Nevertheless, the ranking
formulation has common components with these two papers, as our previ-
ous paper [85] as these three papers formulated ranking based on the similar
browsing models independently at almost the same time frame. But, unlike
this dissertation, any of the above papers do not have a pricing, auctions, and
a generalized taxonomy.
Giotis and Karlin [87] extend markovian model ranking by applying GSP
pricing and analyzing the equilibrium. The GSP pricing and ranking lacks the
optimality and generality properties we prove in the dissertation. Deng and
Yu [88] extend Markovian models by suggesting a ranking and pricing schema
for the search engines and prove the existence of a Nash Equilibrium. The
ranking is a simpler bid based ranking (not based on CPC as in our case); and
mechanism as well as equilibrium do not show optimality properties. This
dissertation is different from both the above works by using a more detailed
model, by having optimality properties, detailed comparisons with other base-
line mechanisms, and in the ability to generalize to a family of rankings.
Kuminov and Tennenholtz [89] proposed a Pay Per Action (PPA) model
similar to the click models and compared the equilibrium of GSP mechanism
on the model with the VCG. Ad auctions considering influence of the other
ads on conversion rates are analyzed by Ghosh and Sayedi [90]. Both these
papers address different problems than considered in this dissertation.
The proposed model is a general case of the positional auctions model
by Varian [54]. Positional auctions assume static click probabilities for each
position independent of other ads. We assume more realistic dynamic click
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probabilities depending on the ads above. Since we consider these externalities,
our model, auction, and analysis are much more complex.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no other work addressing the prob-
lems in the deep web ranking and ad auctions addressed in this dissertation.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
Improved ranking algorithms are crucial for the accessibility as well as the
profitability of the search engines. This dissertation considers the ranking
of organic and sponsored results in web search. We present significant ad-
vancements in both deep web integration and ad auctions. Considering the
importance and dynamism of these emerging areas, there are many related
open problems. We discuss conclusions of the dissertation and promising fu-
ture research directions below.
8.1 Conclusions
We describe the conclusions in deep web integration and ad auctions in the
following two sections.
8.1.1 Deep web Integration
A compelling holy grail for the information retrieval research is to integrate
and search the structured deep web sources. An immediate problem posed by
this quest is identifying relevant and trustworthy information from the huge
collection of sources. Current relevance assessments depend predominantly on
query similarity. These query similarity based measures can be easily tam-
pered by the content owner, as the measure is insensitive to the popularity
and trustworthiness of the results. These considerations are crucial for both
selecting sources and ranking results. We propose an approach for assessing
trustworthiness and importance of sources as well as results based on the agree-
ment between the results. For selecting sources, we proposed SourceRank, a
global measure derived solely from the degree of agreement between the results
returned by individual sources. SourceRank plays a role akin to PageRank but
for data sources. Unlike PageRank however, it is derived from implicit endorse-
ment (measured in terms of agreement) rather than from explicit hyperlinks.
For added robustness of the ranking, we assess and compensate for the source
collusion while computing the agreements. Applying the agreement analy-
sis for the results, we compute trustworthiness and importance based on the
second order agreement between the results. Extending SourceRank to a do-
main sensitive assessment of source quality, we propose Topical-SourceRank:
a trust and relevance measure predominantly based on the endorsement of
sources in the same domain. Our comprehensive empirical evaluation shows
that SourceRank improves the relevance of the sources selected compared to
existing methods and effectively removes corrupted sources. We also demon-
strated that combining SourceRank with Google Product search ranking sig-
nificantly improves the quality of the results. Further our evaluations show
that the proposed result ranking effectively improve precision and eliminate
corrupted results. After illustrating that agreement captures trust and impor-
tance by these experiments, we proceed to compare TSR with domain oblivi-
ous SourceRank and the existing methods. The experiments demonstrate the
added precision by Topical-SourceRank for multi-domain search. We imple-
ment the proposed source and result ranking in our Factal deep web search
engine prototype Factal (http://factal.eas.asu.edu).
8.1.2 Ad Ranking
The added dimension of profit in addition to relevance incurs interesting prob-
lems in ranking sponsored ads. We present a unified approach to ranking of
documents and ads as a utility maximization based on user’s click model. We
derive the ranking function—namely CE ranking—and prove the optimality
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with respect to the user click model. The ranking is simple and intuitive; and
optimal considering perceived relevance and abandonment probability of click
models.
For specific assumptions on parameters, the ranking reduces to a taxonomy
of ranking functions in multiple ranking domains. The enumerated taxonomy
will help to decide optimal ranking for a specific user behavior. In addition,
the taxonomy shows that the existing document and ad ranking strategies are
special cases of the proposed ranking function under specific assumptions.
To apply CE ranking to ad auctions, we incorporate a second price based
pricing. The resulting CE mechanism has a Nash Equilibrium which simul-
taneously optimizes search engine and advertiser revenues. CE mechanism is
revenue dominant over VCG for the same bid vectors, and has an equilibrium
which is revenue equivalent with the truthful equilibrium of VCG.
Finally, we relax the assumption of independence between entities in CE
ranking and consider diversity ranking. The ensuing analysis revels that diver-
sity ranking is an inherently hard problem; since even the basic formulations
are NP-Hard with unlikely constant ratio approximation algorithms.
In addition to proving optimality of the proposed ranking, we perform
number of simulation experiments to approximately quantify the improvement
in profits. The analysis suggests significant improvement in profits by CE
ranking over the existing ranking strategies, and validates the predictions of
our earlier theoretical analysis.
8.2 Future Work
The problems in deep web search are at least as large as those in surface web
search. Though the proposed source and result ranking methods solve some
of the important ones, there are many possible areas of future research.
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For domains without many redundant sources, (e.g. student database of a
university) the agreement based methods may not work. On the other hand
need to analyze trustworthiness and importance is also less in these types of
databases. While the keyword match based methods like CORI or Coverage
may be sufficient for these types of unique databases, the performance and
improvement of these methods may be further explored.
For topic specific sources selection, we currently do not determine source
topics explicitly. Different agreement graphs are based on the manually har-
vested topic-specific sampling queries. It would be interesting to extend this
by topical modeling or classification of databases [91, 92, 93]. Topical sam-
pling queries may be extracted automatically from the databases belonging to
a topic after the classification [27].
The top result being the most popular one is likely to satisfy most number
of users. On the other hand, to satisfy maximum number of users by top-k
results, it is best to diversify top-k results. Another direction is to exploit user
models, if profiles are available.
Another open challenge in ranking results is to decide the significance of
source reputation in ranking results, as we pointed out in Section 2.4. A
possible approach is to assess the variance in intra-source result quality and
change the weightage of linage accordingly. Further, deciding on the tradeoff
between the diversity and uniformity in the results is hard. For this, the
degree of agreement between the sources may be used as an indication of the
appropriate degree of diversity. For example, if the sources provide multiple
distinct clusters of results for a query, including a few results from each cluster
is likely to satisfy maximum number of users.
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Deep web integration systems has to generate wrappers, automatically or
semi-automatically [29]. SourceRank and the proposed ranking tuples will
add to the extraction errors as well. The extraction errors will be reflected
in the same way as wrong attribute values, or as incomplete tuples. The
agreement of these sources and results by other correctly extracted sources
will decrease. Consequently, the extracted tuples and sources will be ranked
down effectively shielding users from these errors. The validity of this intuitive
robustness of the proposed method against extraction errors may be further
explored empirically.
Regarding future research in ad ranking, assessing profits by CE mechanism
on a large scale search engine click log will quantify improvement in a real data.
Learning as well as prediction of abandonment probability from click logs as
well as by parametric learning are interesting problems.
The suggested ranking is optimal for other web ranking scenarios with
similar click models—like products and friends recommendations—and may
be extended to these problems. Further, effective approximation schemes for
diversity ranking based on similarity with the independent set problem may
be investigated.
Another interesting extension is considering mutual influence between the
users—in addition to the mutual influence of ads—in an online social network-
ing context. In social ads, the clicks or shares by a user may influence expected
click rates of his friends. This mutual influence may necessitate substantial
changes in optimal ranking and pricing strategies.
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A-1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem. The expected utility in Equation 6.3 is maximum if the entities are
placed in the descending order of the value of the ranking function CE,
CE(ei) =
U(ei)C(ei)
C(ei) + γ(ei)
Proof. Consider results ei and ei+1 in positions i and i + 1 respectively. Let
µi = γ(ei) +C(ei) for notational convenience. The total expected utility from
ei and ei+1 when ei is placed above ei+1 is
i−1∏
j=1
(1− µj) [U(ei)C(ei) + (1− µi)U(ei+1)C(ei+1)]
If the order of ei and ei+1 are inverted by placing ei above ei+1, the expected
utility from these entities will be,
i−1∏
j=1
(1− µj) [U(ei+1)C(ei+1) + (1− µi+1)U(ei)C(ei))]
Since utilities from all other results in the list will remain the same, the ex-
pected utility of placing ei above ei+1 is greater than inverse placement iff
U(ei)C(ei) + (1− µi)U(ei+1)C(ei+1) ≥ U(ei+1)C(ei+1) + (1− µi+1)U(ei)C(ei)
m
U(ei)C(ei)
µi
≥ U(ei+1)C(ei+1)
µi+1
This means if entities are ranked in the descending order of U(e)C(e)
C(e)+γ(e)
any
inversions will reduce the profit. Otherwise ranking by U(e)C(e)
C(e)+γ(e)
is optimal.
A-2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem. The order by wibi is the same as the order by CEi for the auction
i.e.
wibi ≥ wjbj ⇐⇒ CEi ≥ CEj
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that ai refers to ad in the position
i in the descending order of wibi.
CEi =
pici
µi
=
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
ci
µi
=
bi+1ci+1
µi+1
= wi+1bi+1
≥ wi+2bi+2 = CEi+1
A-3 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem (Nash Equilibrium). Without the loss of generality assume that the
advertisers are ordered in the decreasing order of civi
µi
where vi is the private
value of the ith advertiser. The advertisers are in a pure strategy Nash Equi-
librium if
bi =
µi
ci
[
vici + (1− µi)bi+1ci+1
µi+1
]
This equilibrium is socially optimal as well as optimal for search engines for
the given CPC’s.
Let there are n advertisers. Without loss of generality, let us assume that
advertisers are indexed in the descending order of vici
µi
. We prove equilibrium
in two steps.
Step 1: Prove that
wibi ≥ wi+1bi+1 (A-1)
Proof.
wibi =
bici
µi
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Expanding bi by Equation 6.19,
wibi = vici + (1− µi)bi+1ci+1
µi+1
= vici + (1− µi)wi+1bi+1
=
vici
µi
µi + (1− µi)wi+1bi+1
Notice that wibi is a convex linear combination of wi+1bi+1 and
vici
µi
. This
means that the value of wibi is in between (or equal to) the values of wi+1bi+1
and vici
µi
. Hence to prove that wibi ≥ wi+1bi+1 all we need to prove is that
vici
µi
≥ wi+1bi+1. This inductive proof is given below.
Induction hypothesis: Assume that
∀i≥j vici
µi
≥ wi+1bi+1
Base case: Prove for i = N i.e. for the bottommost ad.
vN−1cN−1
µN−1
≥ wNbN
Assuming ∀i>Nbi = 0
wNbN = vNcN ≤ vNcN
µN
(as µN ≤ 1) ≤ vN−1cN−1
µN−1
(by the assumed order i.e. by vici
µi
)
Induction: Expanding wjbj by Equation 6.19,
wjbj =
vjcj
µj
µj + (1− µj)wj+1bj+1
wjbj is the convex linear combination, i.e
vjcj
µj
≥ wjbj ≥ wj+1bj+1, as we know
that
vjcj
µj
≥ wj+1bj+1 by induction hypothesis. Consequently,
wjbj ≤ vjcj
µj
≤ vj−1cj−1
µj−1
(by the assumed order)
This completes the induction.
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Since advertisers are ordered by wibi for pricing, the above proof says that
the pricing order is the same as the assumed order in this proof (i.e. ordering
by vici
µi
). Consequently,
pi =
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
As corollary of Theorem 2 we know that CEi ≥ CEi+1.
In the second step we prove the equilibrium using results in Step 1.
Step 2: No advertiser can increase his profit by changing his bids
unilaterally
Proof of lack of incentive to underbid advertisers below. In the first step let us
prove that ad ai can not increase his profit by decreasing his bid to move to a
position j ≥ i below.
Inductive hypothesis: Assume true for i ≤ j ≤ m.
Base Case: Trivially true for j = i.
Induction: Prove that the expected profit of ai at m + 1 is less or equal to
the expected profit of ai at i.
Let ρk denotes the amount paid by ai when he is at the position k. By
inductive hypothesis, the expected profit at m is less or equal to the expected
profit at i. So we just need to prove that the expected profit at m + 1 is less
or equal to the expected profit at m. i.e.
(vi − ρm)
(1− µi)
m∏
l=1
(1− µl) ≥ (vi − ρm+1)
(1− µi)
m+1∏
l=1
(1− µl)
Canceling the common terms,
vi − ρm ≥ (vi − ρm+1)(1− µm+1) (A-2)
ρm—the price charged to ai at position m—is based on the Equations 6.16 and
6.19. Since the ai is moving downward, ai will occupy position m by shifting
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ad am upwards. Hence the ad just below ai is am+1. Consequently, the price
charged to ai when it is at the m
th position is,
ρm =
bm+1cm+1µi
µm+1ci
=
µi
ci
[
vm+1cm+1 + (1− µm+1)bm+2cm+2
µm+2
]
Substituting for ρm and ρm+1 in Equation A-2,
vi−µi
ci
[
vm+1cm+1 + (1− µm+1)bm+2cm+2
µm+2
]
≥
(
vi − µi
ci
[
vm+2cm+2 +
(1− µm+2)bm+3cm+3
µm+3
])
(1−µm+1)
Simplifying, and multiplying both sides by −1
µi
ci
[
vm+1cm+1 + (1− µm+1)bm+2cm+2
µm+2
]
≤ viµm+1 + µi
ci
(1− µm+1)
[
vm+2cm+2+
(1− µm+2)bm+3cm+3
µm+3
]
Substituting by bm+2 from Equation 6.19 on RHS.
µi
ci
[
vm+1cm+1 + (1− µm+1)bm+2cm+2
µm+2
]
≤ viµm+1 + µi
ci
(1− µm+1)bm+2cm+2
µm+2
Canceling out the common terms on both sides,
µi
ci
vm+1cm+1 ≤ viµm+1
m
vm+1cm+1
µm+1
≤ vici
µi
Which is true by the assumed order as m ≥ i
Inductive proof for m ≤ i is somewhat similar and enumerated below.
Inductive hypothesis: Assume true for j ≤ m.
Base Case: Trivially true for j = i.
Proof of lack of incentive to overbid ad one above . The case in which ai in-
creases his bid to move one position up i.e. to i− 1 is a special case and need
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to be proved separately. In this case, by moving a single slot up, the index
of the ad below ai will change from i + 1 to i − 1 (a difference of two). For
all other movements of ai to a position one above or one below, the index of
the advertisers below will change only by one. Since the amount paid by ai
depends on the ad below ai, this case warrants a slightly different proof,
(vi − ρi)
i−1∏
l=1
(1− µl) ≥ (vi − ρm−1)
i−2∏
l=1
(1− µl)
m
(vi − ρi)(1− µi−1) ≥ vi − ρi−1
Expanding ρi is straight forward.To expand ρi−1, note that when ai has moved
upwards to i− 1, the ad just below ai is ai−1. Since ai−1 has not changed its
bids, the ρi−1 can be expanded as
µi
ci
[
vi−1ci−1 + (1− µi−1) biciµi
]
. Substituting
for ρi and ρi−1, (
vi − µi
ci
[
vi+1ci+1 + ≥ vi − µi
ci
[
vi−1ci−1 +
(1− µi+1)bi+2ci+2
µi+2
])
(1− µi−1) (1− µi−1)bici
µi
]
Simplifying and multiplying by −1
viµi−1 +
µi
ci
[
vi+1ci+1 + ≤ µi
ci
[
vi−1ci−1 + (1− µi−1)bici
µi
]
(1− µi+1)bi+2ci+2
µi+2
]
(1− µi−1)
Substituting bi+1 from Equation 6.19
viµi−1 +
µi
ci
bi+1ci+1
µi+1
(1− µi−1) ≤ µi
ci
[
vi−1ci−1 + (1− µi−1)bici
µi
]
m
viµi−1 +
µi
ci
(1− µi−1)bi+1ci+1
µi+1
≤ µivi−1ci−1
ci
+
µi
ci
(1− µi−1)bici
µi
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We now prove that both the terms in RHS are greater or equal to the corre-
sponding terms in LHS separately.
viµi−1 ≤ µivi−1ci−1
ci
m
vici
µi
≤ vi−1ci−1
µi−1
Which is true by our assumed order.
Similarly,
µi
ci
(1− µi−1)bi+1ci+1
µi+1
≤ µi
ci
(1− µi−1)bici
µi
m
bi+1ci+1
µi+1
≤ bici
µi
Which is true by Equation A-1 above. This completes the proof for this
case.
Induction: Prove that the expected profit at m − 1 is less or equal to the
expected profit at m. The proof is similar to the induction for the case m > i.
Proof. Base case is trivially true.
(vi − ρm)
m−1∏
l=1
(1− µl) ≥ (vi − ρm−1)
m−2∏
l=1
(1− µl)
Canceling common terms,
(vi − ρm)(1− µm−1) ≥ vi − ρm−1
In this case, note that ai is moving upwards. This means that ai will occupy
position m by pushing the ad originally at m one position downwards. Hence
the original ad at m is the one just below ai now. i.e.
ρm =
bmcmµi
µmci
=
µi
ci
[
vmcm + (1− µm)bm+1cm+1
µm+1
]
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Substituting for ρm and ρm−1(
vi − µi
ci
[
vmcm + ≥ vi − µi
ci
[
vm−1cm−1 +
(1− µm)bm+1cm+1
µm+1
])
(1− µm−1) (1− µm−1)bmcm
µm
]
Simplifying and multiplying by −1
viµm−1 +
µi
ci
[
vmcm + ≤ µi
ci
[
vm−1cm−1 + (1− µm−1)bmcm
µm
]
(1− µm)bm+1cm+1
µm+1
]
(1− µm−1)
Substituting by bm from Equation 6.19
viµm−1 +
µi
ci
bmcm
µm
(1− µm−1) ≤ µi
ci
[
vm−1cm−1 + (1− µm−1)bmcm
µm
]
Canceling common terms,
viµm−1 ≤ µi
ci
vm−1cm−1
m
vici
µi
≤ vm−1cm−1
µm−1
Which is true by the assumed order as m < i.
A-4 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem (Search Engine Revenue Dominance). For the same bid values for
all the advertisers, the revenue of search engine by CE mechanism is greater
or equal to the revenue by VCG.
Proof. VCG payment of the ad at position i (i.e. ai) is equal to the reduction
in utility of the ads below due to the presence of ai. For each user viewing the
list of ads (i.e. for unit view probability), the total expected loss of ads below
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ai due to ai is,
pVui =
1
1− µi
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− µk)−
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− µk)
=
µi
1− µi
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=1
(1− µk)
=
µi
1− µi
i∏
k=1
(1− µk)
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=i+1
(1− µk)
= µi
i−1∏
k=1
(1− µk)
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=i+1
(1− µk)
This is the expected lose per user browsing the ad list. Pay per click should
be equal to the lose per click. To calculate the pay per click, we divide by the
click probability of ai. i.e.
pVi =
µi
∏i−1
k=1(1− µk)
∑n
j=i+1 bjcj
∏j−1
k=i+1(1− µk)
ci
∏i−1
k=1(1− µk)
=
µi
ci
n∑
j=i+1
bjcj
j−1∏
k=i+1
(1− µk)
Converting to recursive form,
pVi =
bi+1µi
ci
ci+1 + (1− µi+1)µici+1
ciµi+1
pVi+1
=
bi+1µici+1
ciµi+1
µi+1 + (1− µi+1)µici+1
ciµi+1
pVi+1 (A-3)
For the CE mechanism payment from Equation 6.16 is,
pCEi =
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
Note that pVi is convex combination of P
CE
i and
µici+1
ciµi+1
pVi+1, and hence is
between these two values. To prove that pCEi ≥ pVi all we need to prove
is that PCEi ≥ µici+1ciµi+1pVi+1 ⇔ bi ≥ pVi . This directly follows from individual
rationality property of VCG. Alternatively, a simple recursion with base case
as pVN = 0 (bottommost ad) will prove the same. Note that we consider only
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the ranking (not selection), and hence the VCG pricing of the bottommost ad
in the ranking is zero.
A-5 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem (Equilibrium Revenue Equivalence). At the equilibrium in Theo-
rem 3, the revenue of search engine is equal to the revenue of the truthful
dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG.
Proof. Rearranging Equation A-3 and substituting true values for bid amounts,
pVi =
µi
ci
[
vi+1ci+1 +
(1− µi+1)ci+1
µi+1
pVi+1
]
For the CE mechanism, substituting equilibrium bids from Equation 6.19 in
payment (Equation 6.16),
pCEi =
bi+1ci+1µi
µi+1ci
=
µi
ci
[
vi+1ci+1 + (1− µi+1)bi+2ci+2
µi+2
]
Rewriting bi+2 in terms of pi+1,
pCEi =
µi
ci
[
vi+1ci+1 +
(1− µi+1)ci+1
µi+1
pCEi+1
]
= pVi (iff p
V
i+1 = p
CE
i+1)
Ad at the bottommost position pays same amount zero, a simple recursion
will prove that the payment for all positions for both VCG and the proposed
equilibrium is the same.
A-6 Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem. Diversity ranking optimizing expected utility in Equation 6.22 is
NP-Hard.
Proof. Independent set problem can be formulated as a ranking problem con-
sidering similarities. Consider an unweighed graph G of n vertices {e1, e2, ..en}
represented as an adjacency matrix. This conversion is clearly polynomial
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time. Now, consider the values in the adjacency matrix as the similarity val-
ues between the entities to be ranked. Let the entities have the same utilities,
perceive relevances and abandonment probabilities. In this set of n entities
from {e1, e2, .., en}, clearly the optimal ranking will have k pairwise indepen-
dent entities as the top k entities for a maximum possible value of k. But the
set of k independent entities corresponds to the maximum independent set in
graph G.
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